CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL REGIMES: A GLOBAL EVIDENCE
Abstract
In this paper, we explore the connection between Central Bank Independence (CBI) and inflation under alternative political regimes. We formulate a predictive model that accommodates CBI in the analysis of inflation and thereafter we regroup the countries based on the choice of political regimes as well as the level of development. We find that CBI has a statistically significant and negative effect on inflation in countries adopting full democratic and partial autocratic regimes; but are statistically insignificant in countries operating full autocratic and partial democratic regimes. The results leading to this conclusion are robust to different levels of development.
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