Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2019), pp. 343 - 366
IMPACT OF CREDIT RATINGS ON STOCK RETURNS
Krishna Reddy1, Rudi Bosman2, Nawazish Mirza3
1Postgraduate Business, Toi Ohomai Institute of Technology, Rotorua, New Zealand.
Email: krishna.reddy@xtra.ac.nz
2Waikato Institute of Technology, Hamilton, New Zealand. Email: rudi.bosman@wintec.ac.nz
3La Rochelle Business School - Excelia Group, La Rochelle, France. Email: nawazish.mirza@spjain.org
ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether a change in credit ratings lead to a change in daily excess stock returns. The sample includes daily stock price data for US firms listed on the Standard & Poor’s 500 from January 2006 to December 2015. Firms’ excess stock returns are compared with the market in a
Keywords: Credit ratings; Firms; Stock returns; Global financial crisis.
JEL Classifications: G01; G14.
Article history: |
|
Received |
: August 1, 2018 |
Revised |
: December 2, 2018 |
Accepted |
: December 17, 2018 |
Available online : January 30, 2019
https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v21i3.986
344Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit ratings measure an entity’s creditworthiness.4 Credit ratings provide
However, credit ratings are only opinions and not recommendations to buy, sell, or hold a security (Gonzalez, et al., 2004; Erlenmaier, 2011; Nordberg, 2011. High ratings are not a guarantee that an entity is a safe investment. Even an entity with an AAA rating (the highest) has approximately one chance in 600 of default over a
Table 1.
Summary of the Rating Scales
The table shows a summary of the rating scales used by the three big rating agencies, namely, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.
Capacity to make timely payment
Description
Investment Grade
Extremely Strong Very Strong
Strong
Adequate
S&P |
Moody’s |
Fitch |
Approx. probability |
|
of default over 5 |
||||
Scale |
Scale |
Scale |
||
years* |
||||
|
|
|
||
AAA |
Aaa |
AAA |
1 in 600 |
|
AA+ |
Aa1 |
AA+ |
1 in 300 |
|
AA |
Aa2 |
AA |
|
|
AA– |
Aa3 |
AA– |
|
|
A+ |
A1 |
A+ |
1 in 150 |
|
A |
A2 |
A |
|
|
A– |
A3 |
A– |
|
|
BBB+ |
Baa1 |
BBB+ |
1 in 30 |
|
BBB |
Baa2 |
BBB |
|
|
BBB– |
Baa3 |
BBB– |
|
4For the purpose of this study, the term entity refers to the issuer of bonds and other securities.
5Examples of financial obligations are loan repayments (principal), interest, preferred dividends, and insurance claims.
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
345 |
|
|
Vulnerability to
Table 1.
Summary of the Rating Scales (Continued)
|
S&P |
Moody’s |
Fitch |
Approx. probability |
|
Description |
of default over 5 |
||||
Scale |
Scale |
Scale |
|||
|
years* |
||||
|
|
|
|
||
Speculative Grade |
|
|
|
|
|
Less Vulnerable |
BB+ |
Ba1 |
BB+ |
1 in 10 |
|
|
BB |
Ba2 |
BB |
|
|
|
BB– |
Ba3 |
BB– |
|
|
More Vulnerable |
B+ |
B1 |
B+ |
1 in 5 |
|
|
B |
B2 |
B |
|
|
|
B– |
B3 |
B– |
|
|
Currently Vulnerable |
CCC+ |
Caa1 |
CCC+ |
1 in 2 |
|
|
CCC |
Caa2 |
CCC |
|
|
|
CCC– |
Caa3 |
CCC– |
|
|
Currently Highly Vulnerable |
CC |
|
CC |
|
|
Default |
D |
Ca |
DDD |
|
|
|
|
C |
DD |
|
The literature reports that changes in credit ratings have different effects on stock returns
346Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
The differences in market reactions to rating upgrades and downgrades can be explained by the discretionary disclosure hypothesis, that is, where managers have discretion over the disclosure of information and prefer to announce good news straight away while allowing bad news to be released more slowly (Chen et al., 2001; Bae et al., 2006; Alsakka and Gwilym, 2012). Therefore, good news is linked with greater disclosure and reduced information asymmetry. On the other hand, bad news is associated with reduced disclosure and greater information asymmetry (He et al., 2011).
A major anomaly is reported by Kenjegaliev et al. (2016) analysing the impact of credit rating changes using German stock data. They show that the German stock market adjusts stock prices long before the rating change announcements are made. Moreover, they report that the market reacts more strongly to downgrades than to upgrades.
Some researchers argue that firms associated with higher credit ratings are viewed as a
Researchers investigating the effect of change in the US firm credit ratings (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Brune and Liu, 2010; Halek and Eckles, 2010; May, 2010; Galil and Soffer, 2011; He et al., 2011), European (Gärtner, Griesbach, and Jung, 2011; Urguiza, Navarro, and Trombetta, 2012; Bernoth, Von Hagen, and Schuknecht, 2012; Fatnassi, Ftiti, and Hasnaoui, 2014; Kenjegaliev, Duygun, and Mamedshakhova, 2016), and Australasian (Choy, Gray and Ragunathan,2006; Creighton, Gower, and Richards, 2007; Li, Jeon, and Chiang, 2008;
Since the US was highly affected by the global financial crisis (GFC), we examine how credit rating change announcements impact S&P500 firms’ stock prices from January 2006 to December 2015. We are interested in determining whether there is information content in credit ratings for current and potential investors in the securities market and whether they lead to significant changes in stock prices after announcements of changes (up or down) to firm credit ratings. We undertake further analysis to determine whether the market reacts more strongly to one of the three credit rating agencies S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. Furthermore, this study analyses whether the impact of ratings changes over or within different classes of ratings, that is, investment versus speculative.
To minimize the impact of other information released at the same time as credit rating announcements, this study uses daily stock returns to evaluate the responsiveness of returns to such announcements. We also control for the impact of outliers, which can lead to spurious results.
The main finding of this study is that credit ratings, on average, are negatively correlated with future default rates. For example, a firm with the highest credit rating of AAA is less likely to default in the future compared to one with a credit
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
347 |
|
|
rating of B. Furthermore, we report mixed results over the different periods tested. Tests for the whole sample produced asymmetric results, similar to prior studies (e.g. Choy et al., 2006; May, 2010; Freitas and Minardi, 2013; Fatnassi et al., 2014; Poornima et al., 2015). A credit rating downgrade leads to a significant market reaction, whereas an upward change in credit ratings has no significant impact on the prices of securities.
II.DATA
Our sample includes firms listed on the S&P 500 index from January 2006 to December 2015. Data for security prices are from DataStream. Daily share prices are used and prices are adjusted for stock splits and dividends. Any firm with less than 10 years of data is omitted. Our final sample includes 449 firms (see Table 2, Panel A). The Thomson One database was used to extract information on the credit ratings of firms. The credit ratings for each company over the
To analyse how the GFC impacted stock prices, the sample is divided into three subperiods: January 2006 to December 2007
The sample is further partitioned into credit rating
Additional analysis was undertaken to evaluate the effect of changes in credit ratings within and between different rating classes. These movements of changes are categorized as movements within
348Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
(961 of 1,359, or 70.7%) occur in the
Table 2.
Description of the Sample
The table shows a description of the sample. Panel A provides a summary of the overall changes in the credit ratings observed during the sample period and in subsample periods. Panel B provides a summary relating to the changes in the credit ratings announced by each rating agency. Panel C provides a summary relating to the changes in the ratings announced for different class
securities.
Panel A – Overall Changes in Credit Ratings Observed
Sample |
Upgrades |
Downgrades |
Total |
|
|
|
|
Total Rating Changes |
|
|
1,427 |
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 |
702 |
657 |
1,359 |
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 |
172 |
128 |
300 |
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 |
60 |
120 |
180 |
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 |
470 |
409 |
879 |
|
|
|
|
Panel B – Changes in Credit Ratings by Rating Agency |
|
|
|
Observations of Rating Changes by S&P |
Upgrades |
Downgrades |
Total |
|
|
|
|
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 |
441 |
363 |
804 |
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 |
95 |
72 |
167 |
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 |
44 |
68 |
112 |
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 |
302 |
223 |
525 |
|
|
|
|
Observations of Rating Changes by Fitch |
Upgrades |
Downgrades |
Total |
|
|
|
|
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 |
199 |
187 |
386 |
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 |
62 |
38 |
100 |
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 |
13 |
35 |
48 |
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 |
124 |
114 |
238 |
|
|
|
|
Observations of Rating Changes by Moody’s |
Upgrades |
Downgrades |
Total |
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 |
62 |
107 |
169 |
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 |
15 |
18 |
33 |
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 |
3 |
17 |
20 |
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 |
44 |
72 |
116 |
Panel C – Changes in Credit Ratings by Class of Rating
Observations of Rating Changes within and Between Rating Classes
Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Sample |
702 |
657 |
1,359 |
Changes within Investment Grade Class |
449 |
512 |
961 |
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade |
85 |
|
85 |
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade |
|
49 |
49 |
Changes within Speculative Grade Class |
168 |
96 |
264 |
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
349 |
|
|
Table 2.
Description of the Sample (Continued)
Observations of Changes between |
Upgrades |
Downgrades |
Total |
|
|
|
|
Total Sample |
172 |
128 |
300 |
Changes within Investment Grade Class |
120 |
91 |
211 |
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade |
14 |
|
14 |
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade |
|
14 |
14 |
Changes within Speculative Grade Class |
38 |
23 |
61 |
|
|
|
|
Observations of Rating Changes in 2008 |
Upgrades |
Downgrades |
Total |
Total Sample |
60 |
120 |
180 |
Changes within Investment Grade Class |
32 |
81 |
113 |
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade |
8 |
|
8 |
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade |
|
11 |
11 |
Changes within Speculative Grade Class |
20 |
28 |
48 |
|
|
|
|
Observations of Changes between |
Upgrades |
Downgrades |
Total |
Total Sample |
470 |
409 |
879 |
Changes within Investment Grade Class |
297 |
340 |
637 |
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade |
63 |
|
63 |
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade |
|
24 |
24 |
Changes within Speculative Grade Class |
110 |
45 |
155 |
|
|
|
|
III. METHOD
The majority of the literature has used event study methods and daily return data to measure reactions to rating change announcements (Hand et al., 1992; Choy et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Galil and Soffer, 2011). These studies consider the rating announcement day as day 0 and measure returns for various windows (from day
350Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
Another issue faced by prior researchers is the impact of outliers on the results. For example, Kim, Kim, and Ergun (2015) remove the top two outliers on opposite sides of the distribution and conclude that the distortions outliers cause can be large. Galai,
Event study method is common to evaluate the type of research question we have, and we use this method. Daily data are used to measure expected and abnormal returns. We use daily log returns because these are convenient for multiperiod returns (Campbel, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1996), a better median is derived when forecasting future cumulative returns (Hughson, Stutzer, and Yung, 2006), and the use of the logarithms of returns avoids negative security prices in security return models (Jorion, 2001). As stated above, a suitable event window to test how credit rating changes impact security prices is 11 days (Corwin and Lipson, 2000; Kryzanowski and Nemiroff, 2001; Choy et al., 2006; Brune and Liu, 2010), that is, from day
Abnormal returns (ARit) are measured using the
(1)
The expected or normal returns for each entity are estimated using a market model. The alpha and beta are calculated using the regression model based on the S&P 500 as the comparative market:
(2)
Next we compute the abnormal returns (ARit) for each company on day t:
(3)
The AR are calculated to determine if returns are significantly different from expected returns after there is a change in ratings. A standard paired
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
351 |
|
|
To evaluate if investors react more strongly to changes in the credit ratings of firms before or after the global crisis period,
IV. RESULTS
Table 3, Panel A, contains results for the differences in means for the credit rating upgrades for the different windows. Panel B contains results for the differences in means for the credit rating downgrades for the same period and event windows. Results corroborate those documented in the literature. The results for 2006 to 2015 considered over a
Regardless of the windows considered, the
Table 3.
The table shows the
Panel A |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Event Window: |
Event Window: |
Event Window: |
|||||
to T+1 |
to T*3 |
to T+10 |
|||||
|
|||||||
|
Variable 1 |
Variable 2 |
Variable 1 |
Variable 2 |
Variable 1 |
Variable 2 |
|
Mean |
0.0013 |
0.0005 |
0.0022 |
||||
Variance |
0.0004 |
0.0005 |
0.0012 |
0.0001 |
0.0038 |
||
Observations |
702 |
702 |
702 |
702 |
702 |
702 |
|
Pearson Correlation |
0.5901 |
|
|
0.5601 |
|
||
Hypothesized Mean |
0 |
|
0 |
|
0 |
|
|
Difference |
|
|
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
df |
701 |
|
701 |
|
701 |
|
|
|
0.8693 |
|
1.2188 |
|
|||
P(T<=t) |
0.0085 |
|
0.385 |
|
0.2233 |
|
|
t Critical |
1.9634 |
|
1.9634 |
|
1.9633 |
|
352Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
Table 3.
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Event Window: |
Event Window: |
Event Window: |
|||||
to T+1 |
to T+3 |
to T+10 |
|||||
|
|||||||
|
Variable 1 |
Variable 2 |
Variable 1 |
Variable 2 |
Variable 1 |
Variable 2 |
|
Mean |
0.0010 |
0.0014 |
0.0040 |
||||
Variance |
0.010 |
3.54 |
0.034135 |
8.8 |
0.096304 |
21.8 |
|
Observations |
657 |
657 |
656 |
656 |
656 |
656 |
|
Pearson Correlation |
0.5043 |
|
0.5701 |
|
0.6247 |
|
|
Hypothesized Mean |
0 |
|
0 |
|
0 |
|
|
Difference |
|
|
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
df |
656 |
|
655 |
|
655 |
|
|
2.8615 |
|
2.4497 |
|
2.7659 |
|
||
P(T<=t) |
0.0044 |
|
0.0146 |
|
0.0058 |
|
|
t Critical |
1.9636 |
|
1.9636 |
|
1.9636 |
|
Further robustness checks are undertaken by removing outliers, first at the
1% level (see Table 4, Panel A). These results support those reported in Table 3. The results for the test after removing 2% of the outliers are reported in Table 4, Panel B, and suggest that the null hypothesis is accepted for the longer event windows. However, when 1% of the outliers are removed, Panel C column 2 shows unexpected results for the event window
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
353 |
|
|
Table 4.
The table shows the
Panel A |
|
|
|
|
Downgrade in credit rating |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|
1% of outliers |
1% of outliers |
1% of outliers |
||
(2006 - 2015) |
||||
removed |
removed |
removed |
||
|
||||
Observations |
650 |
649 |
649 |
|
4.0554 |
2.4516 |
2.0145 |
||
P(T<=t) |
0.0001 |
0.0145 |
0.0444 |
|
t Critical |
1.9636 |
1.9636 |
1.9636 |
|
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|
Downgrade in credit rating |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
|
(2006 - 2015) |
2% of outliers |
2% of outliers |
2% of outliers |
|
|
removed |
removed |
removed |
|
Observations |
644 |
643 |
643 |
|
4.0016 |
1.9079 |
1.5099 |
||
P(T<=t) |
0.0001 |
0.0569 |
0.1316 |
|
t Critical |
1.9637 |
1.9637 |
1.9637 |
|
Panel C |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Window: |
Window: |
|
Upgrade in credit rating |
Window: |
T+1 |
T+1 |
|
(2006 - 2015) |
T+1 |
1% of outliers |
2% of outliers |
|
|
|
removed |
removed |
|
Observations |
695 |
695 |
688 |
|
P(T<=t) |
0.0085 |
0.0459 |
0.2661 |
|
T Critical |
1.9634 |
1.9634 |
1.96342 |
The results of statistical tests for the sample that includes data for the two years preceding the global credit crisis are in Table 5. Upgrades of credit ratings over the longer event windows
354Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
Table 5.
The table shows
Panel A |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Upgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
|
Observations |
172 |
170 |
169 |
172 |
170 |
169 |
172 |
170 |
169 |
|
0.2114 |
0.4233 |
0.3168 |
1.1331 |
1.0688 |
||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0000 |
0.0000 |
0.0000 |
0.4411 |
0.8328 |
0.6726 |
0.7517 |
0.2588 |
0.2867 |
|
t Critical |
1.9739 |
1.9741 |
1.9742 |
1.9739 |
1.9741 |
1.9742 |
1.9739 |
1.9741 |
1.9742 |
|
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Downgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
|
Observations |
128 |
127 |
125 |
127 |
126 |
124 |
127 |
126 |
124 |
|
0.8466 |
1.7664 |
1.4947 |
1.9922 |
1.6232 |
3.1331 |
2.5604 |
2.3325 |
2.4495 |
||
P(T<=t) |
0.3988 |
0.0798 |
0.1375 |
0.0485 |
0.1071 |
0.0022 |
0.7517 |
0.0213 |
0.0157 |
|
t Critical |
1.9788 |
1.9790 |
1.9793 |
1.9790 |
1.9791 |
1.9794 |
1.9790 |
1.9791 |
1.9794 |
The
Table 6.
The table shows
Panel A |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Upgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
|
Observations |
60 |
59 |
59 |
60 |
59 |
59 |
60 |
59 |
59 |
|
2.4346 |
2.3745 |
2.3745 |
0.0172 |
|||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0180 |
0.0209 |
0.0209 |
0.9863 |
0.8588 |
0.8588 |
0.099 |
0.4654 |
0.4654 |
|
t Critical |
2.0001 |
2.0017 |
2.0017 |
2.0001 |
2.0017 |
2.0017 |
2.000 |
2.0017 |
2.0017 |
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
355 |
|
|
Table 6.
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Downgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
|
Observations |
120 |
119 |
118 |
120 |
119 |
118 |
120 |
119 |
118 |
|
0.3654 |
1.0764 |
0.8055 |
0.0063 |
0.3599 |
0.3418 |
|||||
P(T<=t) |
0.7154 |
0.2840 |
0.4221 |
0.9950 |
0.7196 |
0.9432 |
0.7331 |
0.8583 |
0.6564 |
|
t Critical |
1.9801 |
1.9803 |
1.9804 |
1.9801 |
1.9803 |
1.9804 |
1.9801 |
1.9803 |
1.9804 |
Results for the
The results for credit rating downgrades suggest that the securities market does react significantly to them. All three event windows tested show high
Table 7.
The table shows
Panel A |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Upgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
|
Observations |
470 |
465 |
461 |
470 |
465 |
461 |
470 |
465 |
461 |
|
1.4269 |
1.4095 |
2.8167 |
4.5490 |
4.8557 |
||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.2065 |
0.4905 |
0.8027 |
0.3996 |
0.1543 |
0.1594 |
0.0051 |
0.0000 |
0.0000 |
|
t Critical |
1.9650 |
1.9651 |
1.9651 |
1.9650 |
1.9651 |
1.9651 |
1.9650 |
1.9651 |
1.9651 |
356Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
Table 7.
(Continued)
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Downgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
None |
1% |
2% |
|
Observations |
409 |
405 |
401 |
409 |
405 |
401 |
409 |
405 |
401 |
|
3.9592 |
3.7198 |
3.4993 |
2.9708 |
2.1730 |
1.8263 |
2.8167 |
2.0867 |
1.6431 |
||
P(T<=t) |
0.0001 |
0.0002 |
0.0005 |
0.0031 |
0.0304 |
0.0685 |
0.0048 |
0.0375 |
0.1012 |
|
t Critical |
1.9658 |
1.9658 |
1.9659 |
1.9658 |
1.9659 |
1.9659 |
1.9658 |
1.9659 |
1.9659 |
The impact ratings changes on returns by different credit rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P are reported in Tables 8 to 10. For the primary event window of 14 days, the results over the full sample
Results from announcements of downward changes in credit ratings indicate that the market only reacts strongly to changes announced by Moody’s. Over the
Analysis of the rating changes by the individual rating agencies shows very little significant impact on the prices of securities before the global credit crisis. For all three agencies in this study, neither an upward nor a downward change in credit ratings has an abnormal impact over the primary event window of 14 days. The robustness check for the
The comparative analysis of the impact of ratings announcement by the separate rating agencies reveals that the market is reacting more strongly to changes since the global credit crisis than before it. Investors relying on rating announcements by Fitch reacted the most to any changes. The results indicate that
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
357 |
|
|
an announcement of an upward change by Fitch over all three event windows significantly impacted abnormal returns of security prices. Announcements of downward changes by Fitch also produced significant results over the two shorter event windows.
Results from announcements made by Moody’s indicate that followers of their rating changes only reacted significantly to downward changes. These results are consistent with earlier research that concludes that entities tend to release positive information sooner and thus upward credit rating changes do not come as a surprise to investors (Chen et al., 2001; Bae et al., 2006; Alsakka and Gwilym, 2012).
Rating announcements by S&P do not appear to signal new information to the market, since the results show that the only significant impact on security prices is observed in reaction to upward rating changes over the short
Table 8.
for the Period 2006 to 2015
The table shows
Panel A |
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Upgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
|
Removed* |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Observations |
441 |
199 |
62 |
441 |
199 |
62 |
441 |
199 |
62 |
|
1.2235 |
1.8126 |
4.7847 |
1.6750 |
|||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0015 |
0.2226 |
0.1310 |
0.1920 |
0.0714 |
0.2172 |
0.3790 |
0.0000 |
0.0991 |
|
t Critical |
1.9654 |
1.9720 |
1.9996 |
1.9654 |
1.9720 |
1.9996 |
1.9654 |
1.9720 |
1.9996 |
|
Panel B |
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Downgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
|
Observations |
363 |
187 |
107 |
363 |
186 |
107 |
363 |
186 |
107 |
|
1.7954 |
0.3007 |
3.5149 |
1.3410 |
3.8335 |
0.8361 |
0.1014 |
3.9794 |
|||
P(T<=t) |
0.0734 |
0.7639 |
0.0006 |
0.1808 |
0.4520 |
0.0002 |
0.4036 |
0.9193 |
0.0001 |
|
t Critical |
1.9665 |
1.9728 |
1.9826 |
1.9665 |
1.9729 |
1.9826 |
1.9665 |
1.9729 |
1.9826 |
358Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
Table 9.
for the Period 2006 to 2007
The table shows
Panel A |
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|
Upgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
|
Removed* |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Observations |
95 |
62 |
15 |
95 |
62 |
15 |
95 |
62 |
15 |
|
0.1307 |
1.2994 |
1.9516 |
||||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0379 |
0.1218 |
0.2889 |
0.8964 |
0.2148 |
0.8931 |
0.6314 |
0.0713 |
||
t Critical |
1.9855 |
1.9996 |
2.1448 |
1.9855 |
1.9996 |
2.1448 |
1.9855 |
1.9996 |
2.1448 |
|
Panel B |
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|
|
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|
Downgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers Removed |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
|
Observations |
72 |
38 |
18 |
72 |
37 |
18 |
72 |
37 |
18 |
|
1.1633 |
1.1286 |
2.1679 |
2.1910 |
1.9297 |
1.0217 |
1.3210 |
||||
P(T<=t) |
0.2486 |
0.2455 |
0.2748 |
0.3352 |
0.0746 |
0.0426 |
0.0576 |
0.3137 |
0.2040 |
|
t Critical |
1.9939 |
2.0262 |
2.1098 |
1.9939 |
2.0281 |
2.1098 |
1.9939 |
2.0281 |
2.1098 |
Table 10.
for the Period 2009 to 2015
The table shows
Panel A |
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|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
Upgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
|
Removed* |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Observations |
302 |
124 |
44 |
302 |
124 |
44 |
302 |
124 |
44 |
|
2.8192 |
2.2025 |
0.3253 |
7.2004 |
0.7509 |
||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0160 |
0.00561 |
0.1661 |
0.2849 |
0.0295 |
0.2224 |
0.7452 |
0.4568 |
||
t Critical |
1.9679 |
1.97943 |
2.0167 |
1.9679 |
1.9794 |
2.0167 |
1.9679 |
1.9794 |
2.0167 |
|
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Downgrade |
Window: |
Window: |
Window: |
|||||||
in credit rating |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Outliers |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
S&P |
Fitch |
Moody’s |
|
Removed* |
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Observations |
223 |
114 |
72 |
223 |
114 |
72 |
223 |
114 |
72 |
|
4.5043 |
3.8775 |
0.2657 |
2.7443 |
3.4141 |
0.5352 |
1.0353 |
3.3398 |
|||
P(T<=t) |
0.9721 |
0.0000 |
0.0002 |
0.7908 |
0.0071 |
0.0011 |
0.5931 |
0.3027 |
0.0013 |
|
t Critical |
1.9707 |
1.9812 |
1.9939 |
1.9707 |
1.9812 |
1.9939 |
1.9707 |
1.9812 |
1.9939 |
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
359 |
|
|
The effect of a change in credit rating over different classes or within a class are summarized in Tables 11 to 13. Evaluation of the data over the entire period
Breaking the evaluation of rating changes up over the two periods surrounding the GFC yields the following results. For the period 2006 to 2007, the results indicate that an announcement of a change in ratings (upwards or downwards) has no effect on returns. There is one exception, however, which is for upgrades of credit ratings within the
Regarding the results during the period after the global credit crisis, we find evidence that suggests the market is now taking greater note of changes in credit ratings. Our findings indicate that an announcement of a credit rating upgrade where the rating moves from speculative grade to investment grade has a significant impact on security prices. The results suggest this for all three event windows tested. However, when evaluating the announcements of downgrades for the period after the global credit crisis, we find the results show a significant impact only when a downgrade is announced for movements within investment- grade ratings.
Table 11.
for the Period 2006 to 2015
The table shows
Panel A
|
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|
Upgrade from |
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||
Upgrade |
Upgrade within |
Speculative to |
Upgrade within |
||||||
in credit rating |
Investment grade |
Investment grade |
Speculative grade |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
quality |
|
|
|
|
Outliers |
|||||||||
Removed* |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
Observations |
449 |
449 |
449 |
85 |
85 |
85 |
168 |
168 |
168 |
0.4958 |
1.9813 |
2.3275 |
3.2286 |
||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0000 |
0.0441 |
0.6203 |
0.0508 |
0.0223 |
0.0018 |
0.2732 |
0.1565 |
0.4948 |
t Critical |
1.9653 |
1.9653 |
1.9653 |
1.9886 |
1.9886 |
1.9886 |
1.9743 |
1.9743 |
1.9743 |
360Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
Table 11.
Panel B
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Downgrade from |
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||
Downgrade |
Downgrade within |
Investment to |
Downgrade within |
||||||
in credit rating |
Investment grade |
Speculative grade |
Speculative grade |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
quality |
|
|
|
|
Outliers |
|||||||||
Removed* |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
Observations |
512 |
511 |
511 |
49 |
49 |
49 |
96 |
96 |
96 |
3.1989 |
3.2059 |
3.5014 |
0.5106 |
0.7492 |
0.5684 |
2.0175 |
1.3656 |
1.5709 |
|
P(T<=t) |
0.0015 |
0.0014 |
0.0005 |
0.6120 |
0.4574 |
0.5714 |
0.0465 |
0.1753 |
0.1195 |
t Critical |
1.9646 |
1.9646 |
1.9646 |
2.0106 |
2.0106 |
2.0106 |
1.9853 |
1.9853 |
1.9853 |
Table 12.
The table shows
Panel A
|
|
|
|
Upgrade from |
|
|
|
||
Upgrade |
Upgrade within |
Speculative to |
Upgrade within |
||||||
in credit rating |
Investment grade |
Investment grade |
Speculative grade |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
quality |
|
|
|
|
Outliers |
|||||||||
Removed* |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
Observations |
120 |
120 |
120 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
38 |
38 |
38 |
1.7238 |
|||||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0006 |
0.5762 |
0.7615 |
0.6869 |
0.9690 |
0.1084 |
0.4425 |
0.5096 |
0.5107 |
t Critical |
1.9801 |
1.9801 |
1.9801 |
2.1604 |
2.1604 |
2.1604 |
2.0265 |
2.0262 |
2.0262 |
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Downgrade from |
|
|
|
||
Downgrade |
Downgrade within |
Investment to |
Downgrade within |
||||||
in credit rating |
Investment grade |
Speculative grade |
Speculative grade |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
quality |
|
|
|
|
Outliers |
|||||||||
Removed* |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
Observations |
91 |
90 |
90 |
13 |
13 |
13 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
0.0509 |
1.0830 |
0.3164 |
0.4200 |
0.5559 |
0.5441 |
||||
P(T<=t) |
0.5798 |
0.9596 |
0.2817 |
0.2744 |
0.7183 |
0.7567 |
0.6785 |
0.5839 |
0.5919 |
t Critical |
1.9867 |
1.9870 |
1.9870 |
2.1604 |
2.1604 |
2.1604 |
2.0739 |
2.0739 |
2.0739 |
Impact of Credit Ratings on Stock Returns |
361 |
|
|
Table 13.
The table shows
Panel A
|
|
|
|
Upgrade from |
|
|
|
||
Upgrade |
Upgrade within |
Speculative to |
Upgrade within |
||||||
in credit rating |
Investment grade |
Investment grade |
Speculative grade |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
quality |
|
|
|
|
Outliers |
|||||||||
Removed* |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
Observations |
297 |
297 |
297 |
63 |
63 |
63 |
110 |
110 |
110 |
2.0654 |
2.7151 |
2.7377 |
4.0844 |
||||||
P(T<=t) |
0.0109 |
0.4194 |
0.0398 |
0.0086 |
0.0081 |
0.0001 |
0.0729 |
0.1400 |
0.8629 |
t Critical |
1.9680 |
1.9680 |
1.9680 |
1.9990 |
1.9990 |
1.9990 |
1.9820 |
1.9820 |
1.9820 |
Panel B |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Downgrade from |
|
|
|
||
Downgrade |
Downgrade within |
Investment to |
Downgrade within |
||||||
in credit rating |
Investment grade |
Speculative grade |
Speculative grade |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
quality |
|
|
|
|
Outliers |
|||||||||
Removed* |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
T+1 |
T+3 |
T+10 |
Observations |
340 |
340 |
340 |
24 |
24 |
24 |
45 |
45 |
45 |
4.5229 |
4.4778 |
4.4937 |
0.8895 |
1.1219 |
0.7734 |
2.6092 |
1.2244 |
||
P(T<=t) |
0.0000 |
0.0000 |
0.0000 |
0.3830 |
0.2735 |
0.4472 |
0.0154 |
0.2273 |
0.6830 |
t Critical |
1.9670 |
1.9670 |
1.9670 |
2.0687 |
2.0687 |
2.0687 |
2.0154 |
2.0154 |
2.0154 |
V. CONCLUSION
This study examines how credit rating changes, both upgrades and downgrades, influence returns of firms issuing securities. We examine the impact of credit rating changes on 449 of the S&P 500 firms for which
We find mixed results for the whole sample. A credit rating downgrade leads to a significant market reaction whereas an upward change has no effect on returns— findings that corroborate
An analysis of the three subperiods before, during, and after the global credit crisis also delivers mixed results. The results for the two years preceding the GFC are mostly consistent with those for the whole sample, apart for the robustness
362Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019
check over the
For the period after the global credit crisis, we find that downward changes in credit ratings produce significant changes in security prices, similar to earlier studies and to the tests for the whole sample. Since the findings for the event window
Comparison of the results from the period before the global credit crisis (2006– 2007) to the period after it
The impact of announcements of credit rating changes over classes of ratings suggests that the market reacts strongly to upward changes in credit rating from speculative grade to investment grade, as evidenced over all three event windows tested. However, a significant impact is observed for downward rating changes within the
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