Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2018), pp. 149 - 160
DO ‘LABOUR’ COUNCILS LOWER ECONOMIC FREEDOM?
Nicholas Apergis1
1Department of Banking & Financial Management, University of Piraeus, Greece, Yunani.
Email: napergis@unipi.gr
ABSTRACT
Using a panel of the UK counties, spanning the period
Keywords: Economic freedom; Political councils; Regression discontinuity approach; UK countries.
JEL Classification: H11; R58; C33.
Article history: |
|
Received |
: July 5, 2018 |
Revised |
: October 11, 2018 |
Accepted |
: October 13, 2018 |
Available online |
: October 31, 2018 |
https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v21i1.958
150Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 2, October 2018
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the political ideology of an administration authority (either on a national or regional level) affect the economic freedom enjoyed by this country or region? To answer this question, we must first define economic freedom. Gwartney et al. (1996) states that “individuals have economic freedom, when (a) property they acquire without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and
(b)they are free to use, exchange, or give away their property as long as their actions do not violate the identical rights of others.” Based on this definition of economic freedom, Gwartney et al. (1996) develop the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index for 100 countries, spanning the period
Given that the definition of economic freedom places a higher weight on limited government, a potential answer to the opening question of this paper is: yes, local administrators who favor smaller government should support policies that lead to a higher level of economic freedom. In the UK, politicians belonging to the Conservative Party (the Tories) are typically associated with a preference for a smaller government compared to those associated to the Labour Party. In the spirit of Downs (1957), the median voter theorem would suggest that ideology gives way to pragmatism and that administrators seeking to maximize the likelihood of election and
Researchers who have perhaps made the most use of economic freedom data are those studying economic growth. Compton et al. (2011) find that higher rates of economic growth are positively associated with economic freedom. Related work has focused on the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality with mixed results (Berggren, 1999; Scully, 2002; Carter, 2007; Compton et al.,
2014). In addition, research has been done on migration and economic freedom, the black/white income gap and economic freedom, and entrepreneurship and economic freedom2. More germane to our study, Bjornskov and Potrafke (2013) hypothesize that the ideology of economic freedom is favored by Republican voters. The authors examine whether policy in the areas of the size of government and labour market regulation is higher when Republicans are in control of the elected branches of a state’s government. They also find that Republican governors are more active in deregulating labour markets. In addition, Reed (2006) finds that
Democratic control of the state legislature leads to higher tax burdens. However,
2For an exhaustive look at works that use the EFW Index, see Hall et al. (2015).
Do ‘Labour’ Councils Lower Economic Freedom? |
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Reed finds that the political party of the governor has little effect on taxes. This latter result supports earlier findings by Besley and Case (1995). Thus, the influence of administrators’ political affiliation on economic freedom remains unsettled.
One of the more
Given the absence of data on the EFW index for the UK counties, the objective of this paper is to use data on the direct/specific components of the EFW index, such as government expenses, sound money and freedom to internationally trade, to test the idea that the political affiliation of the county councils in the UK has an appreciable impact on those
In reality, there can be certain reasons why a county’s voters would elect a particular individual as member of the council and these reasons can also have an influence on the types of policy changes. Thus, the relationship between the party of the council and the abovementioned dimensions of economic freedom is potentially endogenous. Therefore, the hypothesis that the traits of economic freedom, mainly less government intervention in markets, would be more commonly associated with Conservative than Labour councils, is one that must be tested with a careful empirical approach. The analysis employs a regression discontinuity design that leverages the fact that the party of the council is a deterministic function of the vote margin between the Labour candidate and the Conservative candidate. This approach allows us to compare counties which are similarly situated except for their choice of the party of the council. To foreshadow our results, they provide supportive evidence that Labour councils lead to less economic freedom. In fact, we find strong evidence that a Labour council leads to a higher size of government.
152Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 2, October 2018
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the methodological approach and the dataset employed in this study, while Section III presents the empirical results and discussions. Finally, Section IV concludes.
II.METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. Methodology
A starting point for several previous studies about the relationship between a council’s partisan ideology and economic freedom is a
(1)
where EFWit stands for county i’s component of economic freedom under examination in year t, Dit is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if county 𝑖’s council is from the Labour Party, and 0 if the council comes from the Conservative Party. The coefficient 𝛽 is a consistent estimator of 𝐷, if other potentially confounding variables, both
(1).
In order to overcome the endogeneity issue for unobservable shocks, we follow Lee et al. (2004) and Lee (2008) and employ a regression discontinuity approach. This approach relies on the fact that the party of the council in power is a deterministic function of the vote margin. That is:
(2)
where vit is the difference between the vote share of the first and second place candidates and vit>0, if Dit = 1 and vit < 0, if Dit = 0. We assume that unobservable variables that are not absorbed by the county
Do ‘Labour’ Councils Lower Economic Freedom? |
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(3)
where 𝑓(vit) is a flexible function of the vote margin. A final assumption that must be made is that (vit) is continuous. Requiring that the vote share function is continuous from both directions as it approaches the
The use of the regression discontinuity method thus allows us to compare the components of economic freedom of councils from the Labour Party who just barely won their election with councils from the Conservative Party who just barely won theirs. This is an important point, because the estimation of Equation
(3)does not allow us to comment on the level of economic freedom in a county, where the council of either party won by a relatively large margin. Councils can win elections, because of past policies, because of past economic performance, or because of loyalty to the particular political party, amongst other reasons. These reasons can have implications for the types of policies the council will enact that contribute to a county’s level of economic freedom. Moreover, these reasons can affect not only who wins the race for council, but by how much (that is, the win margin).
The validity of the regression discontinuity approach hinges on the requirement that once we control for vote margin and other observable time- varying confounding variables, a county’s economic freedom score does not change as we cross the threshold from a Conservative council to a Labour council, except for the impact of the council’s ideology. In order to assess this validity, we follow a recommendation by Lee and Lemieux (2010) and regress each of the potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. If these variables are continuous across the
B. Data
The starting point for this project is the UK
154Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 2, October 2018
The data used in this study are drawn from two main sources: the Department for Communities and Local Government’s Revenue expenditure and
As discussed above, our economic freedom measures are based on data from explicit data that describe three out of the five components of the EFW index. These three main components are considered as the dependent variable in our estimates. More specifically, the size of the government across counties is measured as the total net service expenditure per capita of each county, supplemented within analysis of the expenditure on the major local government services within county areas: education, social care, environmental services (e.g. waste management, environmental health), transport (e.g., highway maintenance, bus services), leisure and culture (e.g., libraries, sports centres, museums), administration (i.e., central support services), land use planning, and, social housing. Data are obtained from the Office of National Statistics. Next, we obtain from the Office of National Statistics data on relative county consumer price levels of goods and services in order to calculate the role of inflation as a part of the sound money component of economic freedom. Finally, data on imports and exports per county are obtained from the gov.uk site on Her Majesty’s (HM) Revenues & Customs in order to estimate the trade openness measure per county3
The primary political variable of interest is the political party of each county’s council. First of all, the
A number of variables measuring
3Measured as the percent of the sum of imports and exports to GDP).
Do ‘Labour’ Councils Lower Economic Freedom? |
155 |
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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics
The table provides summary statistics for seven variables. SD denotes standard deviation, minimum statistics (Min.) and maximum (Max.) statistics together with their mean are noted.
Variable |
Mean |
SD |
Min. |
Max. |
|
|
|
|
|
Labour Council |
0.126 |
0.501 |
0.000 |
0.219 |
Personal Income (2010 £, thousands) |
29.56 |
6.48 |
15.29 |
44.78 |
Percent with Bachelor's Degree |
0.157 |
0.046 |
0.068 |
0.317 |
Percent in Metro Area |
0.257 |
0.191 |
0.168 |
0.273 |
Inflation (%) |
1.27 |
0.16 |
1.15 |
1.38 |
Net Service Expenditure Per Capita |
9,367.5 |
1.079 |
9,35 |
9,385 |
Trade Openness (as % of GDP) |
0.65 |
1.02 |
0.54 |
0.78 |
|
|
|
|
|
The table provides summary statistics for seven variables. SD denotes standard deviation, minimum statistics (Min.) and maximum (Max.) statistics together with their mean are noted.
III.EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Baseline Results
Table 2 provides the results from Equation (3) using the entire sample of counties and a linear vote margin control function. Recall that an important assumption made in Section II was that observable and unobservable
The findings document that with respect to the component of the government size (net service expenditure per
The control variables included in this regression specification also display statistically significant relationships across the three specifications of economic freedom. In particular, personal income per capita is positively correlated with all three
156Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 2, October 2018
people with a college degree, the higher the government size and trade openness are, and the lower inflation is. Finally, there is an indirect association between the percentage of population living in metropolitan counties and the size of government, and a positive association between this part of the population and both inflation and trade openness.
Table 2.
The Effect of a Labour Council on Economic Freedom (Linear Version)
The table reports the linear estimates of a Labour council on economic freedom. Figures in brackets denote
|
Net Service |
|
Trade |
|
Variables |
Expenditure |
Inflation |
||
Openness |
||||
|
Per Capita |
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
|
Labour Council |
0.468*** |
0.057*** |
||
|
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
|
Personal Income Per |
1.094*** |
1.659*** |
2.344*** |
|
|
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
|
Percent with College |
0.318** |
1.028*** |
||
|
[0.03] |
[0.06] |
[0.00] |
|
Percent of Population in Metro |
0.127** |
0.562*** |
||
|
[0.05] |
[0.04] |
[0.00] |
|
Adjusted R2 |
0.73 |
0.68 |
0.82 |
|
No. Observations |
1,128 |
1,128 |
1,128 |
Table 3 repeats the previous analysis, but this time it employs a
Table 3.
The Effect of a Labour Council on Economic Freedom
The table reports the
|
Net Service |
|
Trade |
|
Variables |
Expenditure |
Inflation |
||
Openness |
||||
|
Per Capita |
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
|
Labour Council |
0.496*** |
0.069*** |
||
|
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
|
Personal Income Per |
1.138*** |
1.594*** |
2.137*** |
|
|
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
[0.00] |
|
Percent with College |
0.279** |
0.874*** |
||
|
[0.04] |
[0.08] |
[0.00] |
|
Percent of Population in Metro |
0.146** |
0.528*** |
||
|
[0.05] |
[0.03] |
[0.00] |
|
Adjusted R2 |
0.75 |
0.66 |
0.83 |
|
No. Observations |
1,128 |
1,128 |
1,128 |
Do ‘Labour’ Councils Lower Economic Freedom? |
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B. Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
Even though the evidence shows no causal impact of a council’s party on the economic freedom witnessed by a county, it is important to show that the regression discontinuity approach used in this paper is valid. This approach can only be used if the researcher is confident that
A common way to test the validity of the regression discontinuity design is to regress potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. This method, proposed by Lee and Lemiux (2010), examines whether these variables are discontinuous at the vote margin
Table 4.
Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design (Linear Version)
The table presents the results of testing the validity of the regression discontinuity design in its linear version by regressing potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. Figures in brackets denote
|
Personal |
Percent with |
Percent of |
Variables |
Income Per |
College |
Population in |
|
Capita |
Degree |
Metro Areas |
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
Democratic Council |
|||
|
[0.28] |
[0.39] |
[0.55] |
Adjusted R2 |
0.28 |
0.22 |
0.14 |
No. of Observations |
1,128 |
1,128 |
1,128 |
Table 5.
Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
The table presents the results of testing the validity of the regression discontinuity design in its
|
Personal |
Percent with |
Percent of |
Variables |
Income Per |
College |
Population in |
|
Capita |
Degree |
Metro Areas |
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
Democratic Council |
|||
|
[0.28] |
[0.39] |
[0.55] |
Adjusted R2 |
0.28 |
0.22 |
0.14 |
No. of Observations |
1,128 |
1,128 |
1,128 |
158Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 2, October 2018
IV. CONCLUSION
The definition of economic freedom emphasized the importance of limited government with respect to the government size, sound money (inflation) and trade openness
Given this motivating definition and the unsettled nature of the previous research, we hypothesized that Labour councils in the UK would enact policies that would lead to lower economic freedom compared to Conservative councils. The analysis tested this hypothesis using
The results provided strong statistical (and economic) support to the hypothesis. Over the time period studied, we found strong evidence that a Labour council led to lower economic freedom compared to a Conservative council. The conclusion one could draw from these results is that the partisan ideology could affect economic freedom through certain
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