PANEL VAR APPROACH
Denny Irawan and Febrio Kacarib 1
Abstract
The previous financial crisis has revealed the importance of risk in the financial and business cycle within the economy. This paper examines relationship among three cycles in the economy, namely (i) business cycle macro risk, (ii) credit cycle and (iii) risk cycle, and their impacts toward individual bank performance. We examine the responses of individual bank credit cycle and risk cycle toward a shock in business cycle macro risk and its consequence to the bank performance. We use Indonesian data for period of 2005q1 to 2014q4. We use unbalanced panel data of individual banks’ balance sheet with Panel Vector Autoregressive approach based on GMM style estimation by implementing PVAR package developed by Abrigo and Love (2015). The result shows dynamic relationship between business cycle macro risk and financial risk cycles. The study also observes prominent role of risk cycles in driving bank performance. We also show the existence of financial accelerator phenomenon in Indonesian banking system, in which financial cycles precede the business cycle macro risk.
Keywords : Business Cycle Risk, Credit Cycle, Bank Lending, Financial Risk
JEL Classification: E320, G210, G310
1Deni Irwawan (denny.irawan@windowslive.com) is student at the Graduate School of Economics (PPIE) University of Indonesia and Researcher at the Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM) University of Indonesia. Febrio Kacaribu (corresponding author: febrio.nathan@ui.ac.id) is lecturer at the Graduate School of Economics (PPIE) University of Indonesia and Head of Research for Macro and Financial Market Studies at the Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM) University of Indonesia.
404Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
I. INTRODUCTION
The period after the financial crisis is always followed by the introduction of new set of regulations that tighten the activity in the financial sector, particularly banks. In the international sphere this can be seen from the introduction and the implementation period of the Basel Rules by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which is a committee of central banks from various countries around the world. Basel I was officially introduced in 1988, triggered by Latin America debt crises in early 1980s (BIS Website, accessed 2017) and US Saving and Loan (S&L) crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s (FDIC Website, accessed 2017). In the
II.After a long process, it was launched in 2004 and was called the Revised Capital Framework. Likewise, the Basel III, which was introduced in 2010, was a reaction to 2008 financial crisis.
- Early 1980s - |
- Late 1980s - |
- 1988 - |
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Latin America |
US Saving & |
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Basel I |
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Debt Crisis |
Loans Crisis |
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- 2004 - |
- Early 2000s - |
- |
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Asian Financial |
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Basel II |
DotCom Crisis |
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Crisis |
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- 2008 - |
- 2010 - |
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US Subprime |
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Basel III |
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Mortgage Crisis |
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Source: Collaborated from many sources
Figure 1.
Sequence of Financial Crisis and Basel Accord
Each Basel regulation is not introduced to replace the previous one, but rather to revise or to complement with more detailed and tighter regulations on the banking system. Basel I, which is the first attempt to regulate bank’s capital ratio took focus only on the application of minimum ratio of capital to risk weighted assets. This rule is then revised to be more detailed and stringent by Basel II which governs: (i) the application of more extensive minimum capital requirements, (ii) the strict process of monitoring and assessment of capital adequacy, and (iii)
the implementation of obligations for banks to publish their financial statements to encourage market discipline and disclosure of information. Afterward, Basel III tightened the regulation even more by including: (i) the provision of a layer of additional capital reserves, (ii) the provision of
USD TRILLIONS |
USD TRILLIONS |
35 |
North America |
800 |
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700 |
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30 |
Europe |
Others |
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25 |
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600 |
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500 |
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20 |
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400 |
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15 |
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300 |
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10 |
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200 |
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100 |
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 |
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2005 |
2005 |
2006 |
2006 |
2007 |
2007 |
2008 |
2008 |
2009 |
2009 |
2010 |
2010 |
2011 |
2011 |
2012 |
2012 |
2013 |
2013 |
2014 |
2014 |
2015 |
2015 |
2016 |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
II |
I |
Source: Bank for International Settlements |
Source: Bank for International Settlements |
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Figure 2. |
Figure 3. |
Derivative Market Transactions across Regions |
Derivative Market Transactions by Type |
The trend of tightening financial regulation is generally viewed as necessary to accommodate the rapid development in the financial market. As shown by Figure 3, trend of derivative market transactions grew exponentially since 1990. This growth is not only in terms of value and total transactions, but also the number of the derivative products in the market. The development of necessary regulations is needed to keep up with these developments in the market.
The regulations trend which are always coincidence crisis shape regulatory cycle which is in line with business cycle / economy. In general, business cycle is shown by fluctuation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country from its trend line. However, following a formal model developed by Acharya & Naqvi (2012), this study employs Credit Default Swap (CDS) as proxy of business cycle. Then we prefer to address business cycle as business cycle macro risk, since CDS does not fully represent business cycle.
Furthermore, as in BGG (1999), the business cycle is always interconnected with financial cycle, which is usually represented by the credit cycle. This study then tries to relax the financial
406Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
cycle by also examining the risk cycle besides of the credit cycle. The credit cycle is characterized by the flow of bank lending to the economy in order to perform the intermediation function. In line with the credit cycle, the risk cycle is characterized by risk level in each time period of the company both financial institutions and firms in general. In this study the focus is on the bank’
The tendency of more tightened revision of regulation might squeeze the ability of financial institutions (banks) to innovate and to conduct risky activity. Although it will result in more resilient banking system, it will also impact bank’s performance, since banks opportunity to make higher return from conducting riskier activity is becoming more limited. Moreover, banks also face direct opportunity costs as a result of tighter regulation. For examples, the implementation of (i) additional layer of reserve requirement; and higher (ii) Loan Loss Provision (LLP), may limit more
As in with business cycle, the credit cycle and the risk cycle also observe fluctuations by time. The relationship between these cycles are interesting and have been becoming focus of regulator, especially whether the regulator should take part to maintain these cycle to prevent excessive lending and
Business
Cycle
Macro Risk
Bank
Performance
Credit Cycle |
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Risk Cycle |
Figure 4.
Figure 4 describes the main focus of this study in stylized way. Each arrow represent hypothesis to be tested in this study. This study examines the cyclicality relationship between the business cycle toward the credit cycle and the risk cycle. By comparing the relationship of those
Furthermore, this study examines the relationship of the credit cycle and the risk cycle toward the performance of individual banks. This phase of analysis focus on the impact of the
II. THEORY
Since 1980s, the business cycle literatures has been largely driven by Standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982) which assume no financial frictions in the economy. The theory was revised by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist / BGG (1999) which revealed important role of Financial Accelerator – which is refer to credit market friction and financial cycle – in determining the business cycle dynamics. Then, 2007/8 financial crisis stimulated a new strand of literatures of business cycle which not only accommodate financial cycle, but also risk dynamics or risk cycle.
Burns and Mitchell (1946); in Jacobs (1998), one of the first among others, defined business cycle as:
“. . . a type of fluctuations found in the aggregate economic activity of nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle . . .”
The definition above embodies some notable features of business cycle, which becomes focus of many literature on this field. The first one is expansion, the period of surging business activity and gross domestic product expands until the period reach its peak. This period is also known as an economic recovery. The highest point of a cycle, the peak, is a key period in which the economic bubble get burst and economy the economy turns into contraction period. This period is a phase in which ecoomy as a whole is in decline. The lowest point of this phase, which signals the reversal or revival, is called recession.
408Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
2.1.Development of Business Cycle Theory
2.1.1. Econometric Business Cycle Research (EBCR)
Econometric Business Cycle Research (EBCR) is a term referring to strand of literatures combining theoretical and statistical approach in studying business cycle. Term EBCR has been popularized for the first time by Tinbergen (1940). The EBCR approach was developed in some way as a critic toward the
Theory |
Facts |
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Model |
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Economic |
Refined |
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Model |
Data |
Combination of
Theory and Data
Policy Evaluation |
Description |
Forecasting |
Figure 5. The EBCR Framework
2.1.2. Real Business Cycle (RBC) Theory
Standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model is based on seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1982). In the model, a competitive market creates resource allocation that maximizes the household utility with limited budget constraint of each resource (Kiyotaki, 2011). On the standard model, the most prominent determinant of the business cycle are shock by the government budget and technological development (Romer, 2012).
An ongoing debate is still going on about this theory ability to explain the heterogeneity of households and companies in the real world. This assumption is considered too strict. Even so, it encourages the further development/refinement of the RBC theory and not rather neglected its reliability.
In general, RBC theory explains how factors of production, namely labor, capital and other factors (such as technology and government budget) affect productivity (output) in the aggregate sense (Kiyotaki (2011) and Romer (2012)). In conditions where there is positive shock to productivity, the marginal product of labor will increase which will lead to a rise in real wage rates and labor supply quantity. The combined effect of rising wages and employment will drive the output to rise. However, because of the increase in productivity is only temporary, then the growth of output in the future will increase by lower pace than the present growth of output, and the growth of income and consumption will not rise as much as the output growth in the present (Kiyotaki, 2011). This condition will then encourage increase in investment and capital stock in the foreseeable future. This process then creates a new expansion phase. It applies in the opposite direction for the contraction phase.
One of the most criticized aspect of RBC model is its ignorance of the frictions in financial market. This stylized feature of the model departed from the strong assumption of efficient financial market. The hypothesis, which is very strict, assumes that in time of business fluctuation, every agent in the economy will instantly do recalculation of its economic behavior and decision to adapt with the change. Consequently, there is no such frictions in the financial market. Latter, in the late 1990s, BGG (1999) promoted a model to revised this view in examining business cycle.
2.1.3. Financial Accelerator
BGG (1999) are the first to develop a framework which they called as “Financial Accelarator”. In their seminal work, they developed a dynamic general equilibrium model to reveal the frictions in the credit market which play prominent role in determining business fluctuations. The term Financial Accelerator refers to endogenous developments in the credit markets which amplify and propagate shocks to the macroeconomy.
They materialized financial frictions in their model in three aspects. First, they internalized money and price stickiness to examine role of the friction in the transmission of monetary policy. Second, they relax the efficient financial market assumption by introducing lags in investment. Third, they relax the assumption of firms homogeneity in order to describe the condition in which every borrower has different access to capital markets. The main contribution of the model is how the financial accelerator give significant influence on business cycle dynamics.
410Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
Departing from the standard RBC model, and influenced by Financial Accelerator model, Kiyotaki (2011) describes the effects of the business cycle toward the credit cycle. In general, relation between the two cycles are influenced by asset quality at every phase of the business cycle. In the period of expansion, there is substantial increase in the value of assets. The increase, including the value of the assets of the firm, make the firm has higher collateral to be utilized to get credit. Moreover, the business boom condition make firm’s balance sheet substantially sound, which is a sign of growth. These conditions make the firm could obtain more credit to finance new investments and expand further. In line with this, the good economic conditions make the firm able to repay their credit and then it has good credit rating. The level of non- performing loan (NPL) in the banking system is then generally low.
Capital stock, Output |
No Friction |
Financial Friction |
Time |
Source: Kiyotaki (2011)
Figure 6.
Response toward Shock in Asset Quality
The reverse condition happens when the economy is in contraction phase. Impairment of assets (the burst of the boom) and deterioration of economic conditions will generally make the firm experience a decrease in performance and asset values. As a result, loan repayments begin to deteriorate (NPL increase). On the other hand, the banks tend to have lower credit growth. This happens due to (1) deterioration of the financial condition of the firm/debtor; (2) the impairment of the value of assets/collateral; and (3) the bank’s internal condition is getting worse by the rising of NPL rate.
Expansion Phase
Increase in |
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Higher |
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Sound debtor |
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Credit |
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collateral |
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balance |
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asset value |
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expansion |
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value |
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sheet |
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Contraction Phase
Shrinks in |
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Plummeting |
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Deterioration |
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Credit crash & |
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collateral |
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of debtor |
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asset value |
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value |
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balance sheet |
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crunch |
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Figure 7.
Expansion and Contraction Sequence in Business Cycle
2.2. Empirical Studies
2.2.1. Relationship between Cycles
Bertay, et.al (2015) in their study analyzed the cyclicality of individual bank lending toward business cycle. They segregated the sample based on the ownership,
Ferri, et.al. (2014) conducted an analysis of influence between bank ownership and lending behavior of individual banks and its cyclicality over the business cycle. The sample of the study is banks in Europe in the period
412Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
Ibrahim (2016) conducted a study to compare the lending cyclicality between conventional banks and Islamic banks in Malaysia. The sample used in the study includes 21 conventional banks and 16 Islamic banks in Malaysia during the period
As for the case of Indonesia, Pramono, et.al. (2015) in their study examined the influence of Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCB) policy on the growth of
2.2.2. Individual Bank Performance
Glen &
Guidara, Lai, Soumare, & Tchana (2013) conducted a study of
Vithessonthi & Tongurai (2016) in his study analyze the effect of business cycles on the development of financial markets and the risk of individual banks. The samples used were 37 bank went public in seven countries in South America. The result shows that the business cycle
is significantly affecting the banking risks. Besides, the development of financial markets also improve capital ratios and reduce the level of risk exposure of banks, indicating that financial market developments have lowered the banking risk.
Psillaki & Mamatzakis (2017) analyzing the impact of financial regulation and structural reforms and their effects on the efficiency of the banking industry. The sample used was a bank from 10 countries in Eastern and Central Europe in the period
As for Indonesia case, Winata & Viverita (2013) analyzed the effect of the bank’s income structure to
Table 1.
Empirical Literature Review: Business Cycle and Credit Cycle
No |
Author |
|
Analysis |
|
Variables |
|
Sample |
|
Result |
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
1 |
Ibrahim (2016) |
• |
Business cycle |
• |
GDP |
• |
Conventional Bank (Malaysia) |
• |
|
|
|
• |
Bank lending |
• |
Loan |
• |
Sharia Bank (Malaysia) |
• |
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|
• |
Type of Banks |
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2 |
Bertay, et. al. (2015) |
• |
Business cycle |
• |
GDP |
• |
111 countries |
• |
|
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|
• |
Bank lending |
• |
Loan |
• |
• |
||
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|
• |
Ownership |
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|
• |
Private Bank |
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3 |
Ferri, et.al. (2014) |
• |
Business cycle |
• |
GDP |
• |
Conventional Bank (Europe) |
• |
Bank lending significantly |
|
|
• |
Bank lending |
• |
Loan |
• |
Cooperative Bank (Europe) |
|
correlated with monetary |
|
|
• |
Monetary policy |
• |
Policy Rate |
|
|
|
policy |
4 |
Pramono, et. al. (2015) |
• |
Business cycle |
• |
GDP |
• |
Conventional Bank (Indonesia) |
• |
|
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|
• |
Bank lending |
• |
Loan |
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• |
• |
Counter- |
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Cyclical |
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Buffer |
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414Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
Table 2.
Empirical Literature Review: Business Cycle and Bank Performance
No |
Author |
|
Analysis |
|
Variables |
|
Sample |
|
Result |
|
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|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
1 |
Glen & Mondragon- |
• |
Business cycle |
• |
GDP |
• |
Conventional Bank |
• |
|
|
Velez (2011) |
• |
Credit Performance |
• |
Loan Loss |
|
(Developing Countries) |
|
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|
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|
|
Provision |
|
|
|
|
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2 |
Guidara et. al. (2013) |
• |
Business Cycle |
• |
GDP |
• Six largest banks (Canada) |
• |
||
|
|
• |
Capital Buffer |
• |
Capital Buffer |
|
|
• Basel Framework does not |
|
|
|
• |
Basel Framework |
• |
Basel Dummy |
|
|
|
affect cyclicality |
3 |
Vinthessonthi & |
• |
Business Cycle |
• |
GDP |
• 37 listed banks (South |
• |
Bank risk is procyclical |
|
|
Tongurai (2016) |
• |
Financial Development |
• |
Risk Exposure |
|
America) |
|
|
|
|
• |
Bank Risk |
• |
Capital Ratio |
|
|
|
|
4 |
Psillaki & |
• |
Financial Regulation |
• |
Credit regulation |
• 10 countries (Eastern & |
• |
Regulation increase |
|
|
Mamatzakis (2017) |
• |
Banking industry |
|
dummy |
|
Central Europe) |
|
efficiency |
|
|
|
Efficiency |
• |
Cost efficiency |
|
|
• |
Stronger capital raise |
|
|
|
|
• |
Capital ratio |
|
|
|
efficiency |
5 |
Winata & Viverita |
• |
Bank’s income structure |
• |
Income |
• |
Listed banks (Indonesia) |
• |
Income diversification |
|
(2013) |
• |
Market based |
|
diversification |
|
|
|
does not affect |
|
|
|
performance |
|
ratio |
|
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|
performance |
|
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|
• |
Stock return |
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2.3. Conceptual Framework
This conceptual framework refers to model developed by Acharya and Naqvi (2012). The overall economy in this model consists of several sectors, namely, the banking sector, savers, borrowers (both savers and borrowers are referred to as households, for simplicity), and the entrepreneurial sector (corporation).
2.3.1. Bank Lending: Base Case
The framework is based on . Depositors are compensated with rD, the (gross) rate of return on deposits – deposit rate. In t
=1, the bank makes investments in projects (loans) L, while holding a fraction of a deposits as liquid reserves r. In t = 2, the
of success is given by θ. The bank observes θ after receiving deposits and sets rL, the (gross) rate of return on loans – lending rate.
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t = 0 |
t = 1 |
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t = 2 |
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- |
Bank raises deposits |
- Bank suffers early |
- |
Bank projects either |
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- |
Bank observes success |
withdrawals, xD |
|
succeed with probability |
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probability θ and seta |
- Bank incurs a penalty cost |
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θ of fail |
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lending rate rL and |
if xD > R |
- |
Payoffs divided |
|||||
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borrowing rate rD |
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among parties |
-Investments made and bank sets aside resserves R
Figure 8.
Bank reserves R are residual after the bank meets the loan demand:
(1)
The bank could experience withdrawals at, which is represented by random variable
given by, where
. Thus, the total amount of with drawals at
is given by
. If
, then the bank faces a liquidity shortage, and it incurs penalty, given by
,
which is proportional to the liquidity shortage, where. The bank owners’ problem is then summarized by:
(2)
subject to
(3)
and
(4)
where is the expectations operator over the distribution of
and profit,
, is given by:
(5)
416Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
Equation (5) states that the bank chooses deposit and lending rates as well as the level of bank reserves so as to maximize its expected profits, , net of any penalty incurred in case of liquidity shortage and subject to the participation constraint of the depositors given by expression
(3) and the budget constraint given by equation (4). The optimal gross lending rate is given by
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(6) |
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where |
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is the elasticity of the demand for loans. The optimal gross |
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deposit rate is given by
(7)
And, the optimal level of reserves is given by:
(8)
2.3.2. Internal Bank Dynamics and Excessive Lending
Acharya and Naqvi (2012) build explicit model to explain the process behind excessive lending phenomenon. The model take focus on how managerial agency problems can have effect on
bank lending policies. The bank manager has unobservable effort level, , such that
, with assumption that although the loans are affected by effort, they are not fully determined by it.
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t = 0 |
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t = 0.5 |
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t = 1 |
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t = 2 |
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- |
Principal offers contract |
- |
Loan demand L(rL) |
- |
A fraction x of |
- |
Bank projects |
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to manager |
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realized |
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depositors |
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succeed with |
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- |
Manager chooses effort e |
- |
Manager makes |
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withdraw early |
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probability θ or fail |
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- |
Manager receives deposits D |
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investments and sets |
- |
Bank incurs a penalty |
- |
Payoffs realized and |
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and observes success |
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aside reserves R |
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cost if xD > R |
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divided among |
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probability θ |
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- |
Principal decides |
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parties |
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- |
Manager sets rL and rD |
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whether or not to |
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conduct audit |
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- |
Manager is penalized |
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contingent on the |
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audit outcome |
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Figure 9.
Extended
The manager earns income, , which can be interpreted as bonuses, which increases as the manager sell more loans. But the manager also faces a penalty,
, if the principal conducts an audit and it is revealed that the manager had acted
The managerial penalty is some proportion, , of the penalty cost incurred by the bank due to liquidity shortfalls. However, there is maximum penalty level received by the manager,
, so that the managerial penalty is given by
, where
represents the liquidity shortfall, if any, and . Thus, the net wage earned by the
manager is given by .
2.3.3. Bank Liquidity Flush
Acharya and Naqvi (2012) assume an economy in which entrepreneurs have access to projects that yield a terminal cash flow if it succeeds and zero otherwise. Macroeconomic risk is
given by .
The probability of success depends partly on the realization of the state variable, , and partly on the entrepreneurs’ effort decision, ε, which identifies whether the entrepreneur is
diligent () or shirks (
) in which case entrepreneurs extract a private benefit
.
If the entrepreneur is diligent, the probability of success as before is given by , but in the
presence of shirking the probability of success is , where
. Entrepreneurs promise to pay the
. The entrepreneur’s problem as maximizing the expected return is then:
(9)
Subject to the constraint:
(10)
and
(11)
Constraint (10) is the investor’s rationality constraint that says that the expected return to the investor must at least equal the investor’s reservation utility. Meanwhile constraint (11) means the expected entrepreneurial return conditional on the entrepreneur being diligent exceeds his expected return from shirking.
418Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
Then, there is such that, for
, the entrepreneur’s offer to the investors are not enough to satisfy the investors’ reservation utility. Intuitively, if macroeconomic risk is sufficiently high, the probability of success is low, and thus, the entrepreneur has little incentive to exert effort and is better off by shirking and consuming his private benefit.
However, if the entrepreneurial projects are financed by banks instead of dispersed investors, then such moral hazard can be alleviated via monitoring. Formally, in the presence
of bank borrowing, entrepreneurs suffer a cost from shirking, say, . As long as
, the entrepreneur has no incentive to shirk.
Because investors earn on average from depositing money in the bank, in the presence of entrepreneurial moral hazard, investors are better off by depositing their endowments in
banks. However, if , entrepreneurs can attract investors by offering them an expected return slightly above
. In summary, if investors observe
identically, then all investments are
channeled directly into entrepreneurial projects if and into banks if
.
2.3.4. Theoretical Framework: Modified
This study employs conceptual framework developed by Acharya and Naqvi (2012) with some modification. The main framework implemented in this study is based on equation (5), which is:
First modification, we distinguish the risk in the model,, into two risk. First, macroeconomic
risk, , which plays significant role in determining deposit flush received by the banks.
Second, individual bank risk, , which is represented as the share of the performing loan compared to total loan made by the bank. By doing so, the conceptual framework in this study becomes as follow:
(12)
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Characteristic of the Data and Some Related Issues
This study employs quarterly unbalanced panel data from balance sheet of all conventional banks in Indonesia in the period
One of the benefits of the use of panel data is able to provide interpretation that can meet these objectives, in term of variation between individual and
One of the most popular models for cycle analysis is dynamic panel model as used by Ferri, et.al. (2014), Bertay, et.al. (2015), Pramono, et.al. (2015) and Ibrahim (2016) in a study somewhat similar to this study. This model was chosen because of its ability to capture the dynamics between the two variables. So that it is very suitable for use in analyzing the relationship between two variables cycle.
The dynamic model in practical is implemented by entering the lag of the dependent variable as one of the independent variables (Baltagi, 2005). Dynamic panel model is characterized by the presence of more than one source of time persistence. Such conditions create dynamic panel model cannot be separated from the autocorrelation lag because of the presence of one of the dependent variables as independent variables. In addition, this model also cannot be separated from the heterogeneity among individuals who became observation.
Because of that, dynamic panel model is automatically not met the BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) assumptions as owned OLS model standard and standard assumptions of GLS models (Baltagi, 2005). This happens because in dynamic panel model there is correlation between the independent variables with the error term. Because of that, the OLS estimators will be biased and inconsistent. Moreover, the standard GLS estimator cannot be used because there is a correlation between the variables predetermined by the error term. Furthermore, GLS models with instrument variable (IV) also cannot be used because of although it produces a consistent model, it did not provide an efficient parameter. This is due to the model
Therefore, the use of dynamic panel model is not necessary to test classic assumptions on the data samples used. Dynamic panel model was essentially developed to be able to accept the conditions in which the classical assumptions are not met.
Specifically, dynamic panel model that will be used in this research is Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) developed by Abrigo and Love (2015) based on GMM style estimation from Arellano and Bond (1991). Sprecifically, the GMM model is used in combination with a
420Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
robust estimator of Windmeijer (2005) to avoid problems of overidentification and downward bias (Baltagi, 2005).
3.2. Overview of Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) Model
In line with the aim of this study, cyclical relationship between the
This approach is then very suitable to fulfill the aim of this study. By placing every variable as dependent variable, it can observe
The other advantage is it has rich of features. VAR estimation has features of Impulse Response Function (IRF),
However, VAR approach has several disadvantages. First, it can be applied even as an
3.Second, the coefficient result from VAR estimation cannot be interpreted directly. The result is interpreted only it term of its direction (positive or negative) and significance.
Essentially, VAR estimation is developed for
Theoretically, Panel VAR have the same structure as
Think of is stacked version of variable
, while the
is vector of variables for unit
of i.e.,
. Individual is represented by
. Meanwhile
represents time. Common
Meanwhile Panel VAR empirical form is then:
where is random disturbances in the form of
vector and
and
depend on the unit of observation, and
is the lag operator.
3.3. Empirical Model
Recalling equation (13) in Chapter 3, the bank profit is function is as follow:
(13)
So that the bank profit is function of:
(14)
Due to data characteristic, rather than using Loan Rate () and Deposit Rate (
), this study use data of Net Interest Margin,
, which is difference of the
and
. So equation
(14) becomes:
(15)
Based on equation (15), an empirical model might be constructed as follow:
(16)
422Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
where is intercept, and
is parameter. Meanwhile
is the
and
are lag operator.
= Bank profit
= Share of performing loans to total loans made by the bank
= Macroeconomic risk, Indonesia CDS 1Y – Spread
= Total bank loans
= Total bank deposits, represented by total Third Party Funds = Net interest margin (NIM)
3.4. List of Variables
Table 3 gives complete list of variables employed in the empirical estimation. In total, the data set contain unbalanced panel data of 150 individual conventional bank balance sheet in Indonesia.
Focus variables on this study are comprised of four variables. First, the business cycle macro risk, which is represented by CDS spread. In line with theoretical framework on this study which is based on Acharya and Naqvi (2012), this study then uses CDS spread rather than GDP which is very common to represent business cycle. On their paper, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) specifically recommend to use commercial paper spread as the measure of business cycle fluctuations. However, due to limitation and irregularity of commercial paper spread data in Indonesia, this study then employs credit default swap (CDS) spread data, which also represents macroeconomic risk.
The second focus variable of this study is bank lending, which represents credit cycle. The data come from individual bank balance sheet. All bank balance sheet data are acquired from website of Bank Indonesia and Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, which are based on monthly and quarterly report of bank balance sheet. Bank lending data employed in this study uses outstanding credit data on the balance sheet. The data is then transformed into natural logarithm and then extracted to its cycle component using
is performing loan (), which represents the risk cycle. The data acquired from Net Non-
Performing Loan (NPL) data, specifically = 100 - NPL. The data is then transformed into natural logarithm and the cycle component is extracted. Lastly, the fourth focus variable is bank performance, which is represented by the bank quarter profit. The data is also transformed into natural logarithm and then extracted to its cycle component.
Besides of the focus variables, there are also two other variables which are theoretically important, the deposit and net interest margin. The deposit data is sum of the total of third party fund, comprised of giro, savings and
do not report their loan rate and deposit rate in their balance sheet, but they report their net interest margin, which is the difference of both. The data is extracted into its cycle component by using HP filter.
Table 3.
List of Variables
Variables |
Symbol |
Unit |
Source |
Treatment |
Business Cycle Macro Risk |
|
|
|
|
Credit Default Swap (CDS) – |
|
Percentage |
Bloomberg |
Cycle |
Spread |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Credit Cycle |
|
|
|
|
Bank Lending |
|
Million Rp |
OJK |
Cycle of Natural Log |
Risk Cycle |
|
|
|
|
Performing Loan |
|
Percentage |
OJK |
Cycle |
Bank Performance |
|
|
|
|
Profit |
|
Million Rp |
OJK |
Cycle of Natural Log |
Bank |
|
|
|
|
Important |
|
|
|
|
Net Interest Margin (NIM) |
|
Percentage |
OJK |
Cycle |
|
Million Rp |
OJK |
Cycle of Natural Log |
|
|
|
|
|
|
*OJK stands for Otoritas Jasa Keuangan or Financial Service Authority
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS 4.1. Estimation Result
The suitability of the theoretical framework and rich feature of VAR estimation method has made it possible to answer all research questions in only one estimation process. VAR estimation is conducted with variables lag of 3 and instrument lag of 1/9. The complete result of tests and estimations are in the Appendix section.
Table 4 presented
Table 4.
Variable |
|
Variable |
||
|
|
|
|
|
business cycle macro risk |
0.000 |
|
nim |
0.000 |
credit cycle |
0.000 |
|
deposit |
0.000 |
risk cycle |
0.000 |
|
profit |
0.000 |
|
|
|
|
|
424Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
With selected lag specification, VAR stability check indicates stability of the model (Figure 10). It can be concluded as all eigenvalue lie inside the unit circle. It means that all eigenvalue has value equal to or less than 1. This stability condition is necessary for VAR estimation otherwise the estimation result become unreliable for analysis and the VAR system need to be recalibrated.
Roots of the companion matrix
1 |
|
|
|
|
.5 |
|
|
|
|
Imaginary 0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
.5 |
1 |
Real
Figure 10.
VAR Stabtility Check Result
Results presented on this section are arranged following 8 research questions of this study. Each
4.1.1.
Estimation result from VAR and Granger Causality test reveal
Table 5.
VAR Estimation and Granger Causality Result
VAR Estimation Result |
Variable |
Independent |
Coefficient |
Prob > |z| |
|
Prob > |
|
|
Dependent |
Variable |
||||
|
chi2 |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Business |
|
7.2628 |
0.002 |
|
0.000 |
|
Cycle |
|
|
0.015 |
|
|
|
Macro |
|
|
2.5197 |
0.035 |
|
|
Risk |
) |
|
0.000 |
|
0.000 |
|
( |
|
|
||||
|
0.0044 |
0.002 |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
Credit |
|
|
0.046 |
|
|
|
Cycle ( |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
Business |
|
0.665 |
|
0.024 |
||
Cycle |
|
|
0.0044 |
0.766 |
|
|
Macro |
|
|
0.004 |
|
|
|
Risk |
|
|
|
|
||
) |
|
0.004 |
|
0.000 |
||
( |
|
|
||||
Risk Cycle |
|
0.628 |
|
|
||
|
0.953 |
|
|
|||
( |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit |
|
|
0.0006 |
0.297 |
|
0.000 |
) |
|
0.0009 |
0.102 |
|
|
|
Cycle ( |
|
0.0018 |
0.002 |
|
|
|
Risk Cycle |
|
5.6197 |
0.000 |
|
0.000 |
|
( |
) |
|
1.5556 |
0.067 |
|
|
|
|
|
1.4232 |
0.047 |
|
|
Estimation result from VAR and Granger Causality test also reveal
426Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
buscyc_risk : credit_cycle |
credit_cycle : buscyc_risk |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
95% CI |
IRF |
|
95% CI |
IRF |
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
|
step |
|
|||
|
|
|
|
step |
|
impulse : responseimpulse : response
buscyc_risk : risk_cycle |
risk_cycle : buscyc_risk |
0 |
|
|
.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
95% CI |
Cumulative IRF |
|
|
|
.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
95% CI |
IRF |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
step |
|
|
step |
|
impulse : responseimpulse : response
credit_cycle : risk_cycle |
credit_cycle : risk_cycle |
15 |
95% CI |
IRF |
100 |
95% CI |
Cumulative IRF |
|
|
|
|
||||
10 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
|
|
|
5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
step |
|
|
|
step |
|
impulse : response |
impulse : response |
Figure 11.
As for credit cycle and risk cycle, VAR estimation result indicate that shock in the credit cycle affect the risk cycle. On the oppposite, shock in risk cycle also has significant impact toward credit cycle (Table 5). The result are also supported by
it reveals
4.1.2.
Estimation result from VAR and Granger Causality test reveal
Table 6.
Estimation Result: Business Cycle and Bank Performance
VAR Estimation Result |
Variable |
Independent |
Coefficient |
Prob > |z| |
|
Prob > |
|
|
Dependent |
Variable |
||||
|
chi2 |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Business |
|
0.312 |
|
0.246 |
||
Cycle |
|
|
0.0193 |
0.077 |
|
|
Macro |
Risk |
|
0.957 |
|
|
|
( |
) |
|
|
|
||
|
0.1404 |
0.227 |
|
0.006 |
||
|
|
|
|
|||
Bank |
|
|
0.0275 |
0.827 |
|
|
|
|
0.014 |
|
|
||
Performance |
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
||
( |
) |
|
|
|
|
|
Credit Cycle |
|
0.473 |
|
0.530 |
||
|
0.0004 |
0.345 |
|
|
||
( ) |
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
0.232 |
|
|
|
Bank |
|
|
0.063 |
|
0.011 |
|
Performance |
|
29.0063 |
0.003 |
|
|
|
( |
) |
|
0.010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Bank |
|
|
0.223 |
|
0.430 |
|
|
|
0.666 |
|
|
||
Performance |
|
|
|
|||
|
0.0152 |
0.307 |
|
|
||
( |
) |
|
|
|
||
|
0.0994 |
0.036 |
|
0.075 |
||
|
|
|
|
|||
Risk |
Cycle |
|
0.524 |
|
|
|
( |
) |
|
0.0493 |
0.284 |
|
|
428Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
the opposite, bank performance does not
Credit cycle has lagged impact toward bank performance as shown by estimation result (Table 6). On the other hand, shock in bank performance does not have impact toward credit cycle. Granger Causality also confirm VAR estimation result. Credit cycle
buscyc_risk : profit
.6 |
95% CI |
IRF |
|
||
.4 |
|
|
.2 |
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
step |
|
impulse : response
profit : buscyc_risk
.05 |
95% CI |
IRF |
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
step |
|
impulse : response
credit_cycle : profit |
profit : credit_cycle |
20 |
|
|
.002 |
95% CI |
IRF |
|
|
|
|||
0 |
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
95% CI |
IRF |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
||
0 |
5 |
10 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
step |
|
|
step |
|
impulse : response |
impulse : response |
risk_cycle : profit |
profit : risk_cycle |
.2 |
95% CI |
IRF |
.05 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
95% CI |
IRF |
|
|
|
|
|||
0 |
5 |
10 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
step |
|
|
step |
|
impulse : response |
impulse : response |
Figure 12.
Impulse Response Function: Business Cycle Macro Risk and Bank Performance
Shock in the the risk cycle has weak impact toward bank performance (Table 6). On the oppposite, shock in bank performance does not has impact toward the risk cycle. Granger Causality test results resembles the VAR estimation result. It can be inferred that the risk cycle weakly
4.1.3. Business Cycle Macro Risk Dynamics: Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
Figure 13 present Cholesky IRF of response of the credit cycle and risk cycle due to shock from the business cycle macro risk. The left side is the IRF of the credit cycle. Meanwhile the right side is the IRF of the risk cycle. By comparing the left picture and the right picture, it can be seen different response of the credit cycle and the risk cycle toward shock of business cycle macro risk. Credit cycle reveals stable response pattern toward shock in business cycle macro risk. Meanwhile risk cycle exhibit cyclical response toward shock in business cycle.
430Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
buscyc_risk : credit_cycle |
buscyc_risk : risk_cycle |
0 |
|
0 |
|
||
|
||
|
||
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
|
step |
impulse : response |
|
95% CI |
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
IRF |
|
Figure 13.
Response of Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle toward Shock in Business Cycle Macro Risk
Comparison of these two IRF responses give comprehensive answer toward the first of two main research questions addressed by this study, expecially to explain cyclical relationship of the
buscyc_risk : credit_cycle |
buscyc_risk : risk_cycle |
0 |
|
0 |
|
||
|
||
|
||
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
|
step |
impulse : response |
|
95% CI |
0 |
5 |
10 |
Cumulative IRF
Figure 14.
Cumulative Response of Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle toward Shock in Business Cycle
Meanwhile Figure 13 presents Cumulative Cholesky IRF of the credit cycle and risk cycle in cumulative version. The IRF show negative relationship of shock in business cycle macro risk toward credit cycle. The IRF of risk cycle also show similar result. The overall impact of
shock business cycle macro risk toward risk cycle is negative. Since business cycle macro risk is represented by Indonesia CDS 1Y spread, increase in the spread means contraction in business cycle macro risk. Negative relationship among business cycle macro risk and credit cycle thus has meaning of
4.1.4. Bank Performance Dynamics: Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
Figure 15 presents Cholesky IRF of the response of bank performance caused by shock in credit cycle and risk cycle. The left side is the IRF describing impact in profit due to shock in the credit cycle. Meanwhile the right side is the IRF of shock in the risk cycle toward profit. By comparing the left picture and the right picture, it can be seen common response of bank performance, as represented by profit, caused by shock in the credit cycle and the risk cycle. Both credit cycle and risk cycle cause cyclical response toward bank performance. However, shock from risk cycle shows a bit more unstable response compared to shock from the credit cycle.
credit_cycle : profit |
risk_cycle : profit |
20 |
|
.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
.1 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
||
|
|
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
|
step |
impulse : response |
|
95% CI |
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
IRF |
|
Figure 15.
Response of Bank Performance toward shocks in Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
Comparison of these two IRF responses give answer toward the second question of two main research questions addressed by this study, especially to explain loss of profit opportunity borne by banks due to risk control and credit control regulation. By the magnitude of response,
432Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
the result is clear. Bank performane tends to be more sensitive toward credit cycle shock rather than risk cycle. As presented by model of Acharya and Naqvi (2012), bank lending is direct
credit_cycle : profit |
risk_cycle : profit |
20 |
|
|
.4 |
|
|
0 |
|
|
.2 |
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
0 |
5 |
10 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
|
step |
|
|
|
impulse : response |
|
95% CI |
Cumulative IRF |
|
|
Figure 16. Cumulative Response of Bank Performance toward
shocks in Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
Figure 16 presents Cholesky IRF of bank performance as impacted by the credit cycle and risk cycle, in cumulative version. The IRF show negative relationship of shock in credit cycle toward bank performance. This result means that by expanding its lending, the bank takes more risk, which might lower the profitability. While the IRF of bank performance due to shock in risk cycle show positive relationship. Positive shock in risk cycle, which is represented by increase in performing loan level, will have positive impact toward bank profit. This result emphasize the importance of risk management at internal bank level both in the form of prudence credit assessment and supervision. Profit maximization at individual bank level is very sensitive toward dynamics of credit cycle and crisk cycle.
4.2. Discussion
4.2.1. A Tale of Two Cycles: Business Cycle (Macro Risk) and Financial Cycle
Seminal work of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist / BGG (1999) has broadened the scope of business cycle literatures by promoting the important role of financial cycle in business cycle analysis. The term “Financial Accelerator” became popular and subject of many researches in
macroeconomics. Financial accelerator phenomenon addresses the dynamics of financial cycle which propagates to output fluctuation. However, the formal model presented by them is not suitable enough for study at individual bank level. The framework is too macro for such study.
This study unexpectedly exhibits the financial accelerator phenomenon in Indonesia banking system in the period of 2005q1 to 2014q4. VAR estimation and
As in BGG (1999), such phenomenon is caused by the existence of credit market frictions. In such ideal world, financial market is perfectly efficient so that every agent in economy can recalculate their decision instantly if any shock happens. Three features of credit market frictions in the BGG model are (i) money and price stickiness; (ii) lags in investment; and (iii) heterogeneity among firms. This study, even though is not specifically intended to examine BGG framework, accommodates those three features in some way. First, money and price stickiness are accounted in the estimation with net interest margin as representative of cost of fund. Second, lags in investment, which is represented by credit cycle, is accounted in the estimation which the result reveales lagged / indirect /
4.2.2. Inside the Financial Cycle: Credit Cycle and Risk Cycle
As Acharya and Naqvi (2012) published their work about the “Seeds of Crisis”, scope of the business cycle once again became more comprehensive. Financial cycle, which was solely represented by credit cycle, started to account the importance of risk dynamics. Their model talks about the process of
This study only implements the beginning phase of the model presented by Acharya and Naqvi (2012). This study focuses on the propagation of shock in business cycle macro risk toward balance sheet of individual bank. The whole study is conducted in the business cycle context, in which all variables are extracted to its cycle component.
434Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 4, April 2017
Estimation result exhibits
Meanwhile risk cycle is shown to be unstable along the fluctuation in business cycle macro risk. The relationship is also
4.2.3. Fund Allocation and Performance Risk
As the bank get liquidity flush resulted from business cycle swing, it has two option to increase risk; it can either simply lend more money to borrower with similar risk profile or conduct risk- shifting activity by giving credit to other borrower with worse risk profile. In other words, the bank can simply switch into riskier assets. Unfortunately the data and capability of the model applied in this study cannot observe this phenomenon closer. The only available channel to explain
This feature then make the model assume that risk in the model are solely caused from increasing amount of the credit. Meanwhile the risk profile of the projects to invested by the banks does not vary. This disadvantage gives the room for further improvement of the model. Separating
4.2.4. Liquidity and
As the framework predict, we get a sign of
deposit : credit_cycle
1.5 |
95% CI |
Cumulative IRF |
|
|
|
||
1 |
|
|
|
.5 |
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
0 |
5 |
10 |
|
|
step |
|
impulse : response
Figure 17.
IRF of Credit Cycle and Deposit
In the next episode of the model, this
Further the model also addresses a more detail aspect of excessive lending activity. The model tells that flush of liquidity into the bank will trigger excessive lending through the bank manager will set lower rate of lending. This logic is strongly supported by the estimation result. Net Interest Margin (NIM), which represents rate of lending and deposit react negatively to shock in deposit. This
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Figure 18. NIM, Deposit, and Credit Cycle
At practical level, the story is more interesting. Many banks in Indonesia are outsourcing some of its activity to the
4.2.5. Performance Dynamics and Reponse of Banker and Regulator
This study further contributes by accommodating bank performance dynamics in the discussion on context of the business cycle dynamics. For the bankers, profit is one of the most important barometer of their success. This notion applies since bank as a financial institution is basically similar with other business entity, in sense that their objective is to maximize profit.
The model presented by Acharya and Naqvi (2012) is very suitable not only to discuss
Business cycle, through credit cycle and risk cycle, is shown to play important role in determining bank performance (profitability). The result obtained in this study also shows that
the notion “high risk - high return” applies in banking business. Therefore, regulator need to be aware of the
For the bank, this result means the bank needs to pay close attention to both credit cycle and risk cycle. Both variable are significant, sensitive and unstable in affecting dynamics of profit. Role of internal audit to ensure compliance of credit process needs to be strengthen. The separation of credit analyst autority and marketing division is one of a good example of internal control in the bank.
Meanwhile for regulator, they clearly need to give focus on risk cycle due to its higher sensitivity rather than credit cycle toward shock in business cycle macro risk. The regulation on bank lending might be made a bit more adjustable as long as the bank can maintain its NPL level.
Overall, the model presented by Acharya and Naqvi (2012), which is applied in this study, seems to be very resourceful in addressing the dynamics of
V. CONCLUSION
5.1.
The result of this study, as presented in Section 5, has successfully answered two main topics addressed. First, dynamic cyclical relationship among the
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Result of the Study:
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Figure 19 wraps up the conclusion of this study. First, business cycle macro risk and credit cycle exhibit
Fourth, business cycle macro risk and bank performance indicates
Seventh, when comparing impact of shock of business cycle macro risk toward credit cycle and risk cycle, it can be inferred that risk cycle is more sensitive. The Cholesky IRF reveals response of response of risk cycle toward shock in business cycle macro risk. Last, eighth, bank performance seems to be sensitive toward both shock of risk cycle and credit cycle.
5.2. Notable Contributions
This study exhibits the initial finding of the existence of financial accelerator phenomenon in Indonesia. The result show dynamics of financial cycle – in the form of credit cycle and risk cycle - preceded the business cycle macro risk. This study then has contributed to the business cycle literature by revealing this phenomenon especially in emerging country. This finding is very important in order to deeply understand the financial cycle characteristic in Indonesia. Further research need to extend the analysis by examining real output fluctuation, which was not addressed in this study.
This study is also one of the first to employ CDS spread as alternative representative of the business cycle fluctuation in Indonesia. Especially since previous studies mostly employed GDP as representative of business cycle fluctuation. In fact, Indonesia did not experience GDP contraction in 2007/8 financial crisis. So GDP can explain almost nothing when examining business cycle fluctuation in the episode of 2007/8 financial crisis in Indonesia.
Furthermore, most studies addressed financial cycle issue by only focusing on credit cycle. This study is then one of the first to examine financial cycle in the form of credit cycle and risk cycle at individual bank level in Indonesia. Risk cycle – besides of credit cycle – has attracted many attentions after 2007/8 crisis. Credit cycle can no more solely explain the dynamics of financial cycle and its relationship with business cycle.
In term of econometrical method, this study attempted to employ a newly developed statistical package – Panel VAR / PVAR – from Abrigo and Love (2015). VAR approach which had long historical implementation in time series context is now possible to be implemented in panel context because of this package.
5.3. Recommendations
From the stance of the policy maker, specifically banking regulator, the result obtained in this study reveal the cyclical and unstable response of the financial cycle (credit and risk) due to shock in business cycle macro risk. The result then gives important insight for the regulator in the implementation of
For market participants, especially the bankers, this study has revealed unstable response of profit due to the shock in business cycle through the risk and credit channel. This result somewhat strengthens the existence of the notion of “high risk – high return” in the banking business. The bankers then need to give special attention in the internal bank risk cycle, along with the internal bank credit cycle. As modeled by theoretical framework used in this study, the bankers are assumed to get more bonuses by selling more credit. The bankers might need to find the alternative scheme of incentive in lending system. Separation of the marketing department with the credit approval analyst is one of good example. The bankers might also consider the effectiveness of flat incentive system in credit selling. However, this study does not intend to examine these alternatives. Further research is needed to provide comprehensive discussion toward this topic.
5.4. Disadvantages and Suggestion for Further Research
From the point of view of econometrical approach, Panel VAR approach employed in this study gives satisfying solution. If it seems possible, further study might explore a more complex statistical setting such as Panel VECM approach to conduct more comprehensive examination.
For further research, it might be very fruitful if the design of this research can be uplifted to cover
Finally, recalling the complete formal model presented by Acharya and Naqvi (2012), the design employed in this study has not yet captured the whole feature of the model. Their model essentially was designed to explain the full story of the birth of crisis, which they called as “The Seeds of Crisis”. So, the story presented by this study is only the beginning phase of the complete tale covered by the model. Further research certainly need to address the model in complete setting.
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