COMPETITION AND
INTERACTIONS: PANEL ESTIMATES
ON INDONESIAN BANKING
Peter Abdullah1
Pakasa Bary
Rio Khasananda
Rahmat Eldhie Sya’banni
Abstract
This paper discusses banking competition and
Keywords: Banking, monetary policy
JEL Classifications: C70, E50, G21
1Peter Abdullah is a Senior Economist at Bank Indonesia, while Pakasa Bary, Rio Khasananda and Rahmat Eldhie Sya’banni are Economists. The views expressed on this paper are those of the authors’ and not necessarily represents the views of Bank Indonesia.
22Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
I. INTRODUCTION
Our preliminary investigation indicates that the response of deposit interest rate and lending rate towards monetary policy in Indonesia has been asymmetric. The response of deposit rate has been relatively proportional and timely, whereas the response of lending rate has been lagging and relatively rigid. This could be an indication of uncompetitive market (Cottarelli dan Kourelis, 1994; Borio and Fritz, 1995). Moreover, responses towards monetary policy among group of banks with different assets are heterogenous. Therefore, it indicates that some behavior related to individual market power and interaction among banks affect the industry response.
Those problems, which related to competition behavior in banking industry, are likely to affect the monetary policy transmission, particularly through interest rate channel and lending channel. Further, competition is also a relevant factor to increase efficiency (Hafidz dan Astuti, 2013) and to determine interest rates (Muljawan et. al. 2014).
Previous literatures conduct empirical estimates on this issue by applying
Ariefianto (2009) suggest estimating specification that derived from
This research will examine competition in banking industry using industrial organization approach, also by improving methods to determine sample selection. Further, this research will model interest rate setting on a bank towards monetary policy using game theory and analyze the implications on monetary policy transmissions. Particularly, this research tries to answer three questions; first, how is the competition behavior on Indonesian banking industry? Second, if the leader(s) exist, how the followers will respond to leader’s decisions? Third, how does the bank competition indirectly affect monetary policy transmissions?
This research is aim to contribute a more interactive indication about competition behavior on banking industry. In addition, this research potentially indicates a recommendation to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. We limit the analysis on the case of Indonesia.
Competition and |
23 |
II. THEORY
Bank competition is essential to be discussed. Competition between banks tends to raise efficiency (Hafidz and Astuti, 2013). Empirically, the degree of competition is one of determining factors of interest rate (Muljawan et. al. 2014). Moreover, a more concentrated banking industry has more rigid interest rate movement (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992). However, Adams and Amel, (2011) said that the relationship between banking competition and monetary policy response are ambiguous.
Previous empirical studies conduct estimates on this issue by applying a
Ariefianto (2009) suggest estimating specification that derived from
We recall a form of
1.Two bank products, deposit and credit, are homogenous. Bank 1 and bank 2 have linier function of deposit and credit demand:
rL = α - βL ; L= L1 + L2 |
(1) |
rD = a + bD ; D = D1 + D2 |
(2) |
2.Banks using deposit and credit quantities as strategic instrument
3.Linier cost function:
C1 |
(L1, D1) = γL,1L1 |
+ γD,1D1 |
(3) |
C2 |
(L2, D2) = γL,2L2 |
+ γD,2D2 |
(4) |
4.Interbank money market rate (r) is exogenous variable as it affected by monetary policy of Bank Indonesia.
24Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
5. Profit function of bank:
�i = rLLi - rDDi - r(Li - Di) - Ci(Li, Di) |
(5) |
Combining equations (1) to (5) above, obtained maximization utility function of bank:
(6)
First partial differentiation of (6) to lending and credit variable derives equation (7) and
(8) as follows:
Li = |
α - r - γL,i |
- |
1 |
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LP - |
1 |
(7) |
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2β |
2 |
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2 |
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Di = |
r - a + γD,i |
- |
1 |
DP - |
1 |
(8) |
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2 |
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2b |
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2 |
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Equation (7) and (8) show that the quantity of credit (deposit) of a bank is affected inversely by that the quantity of credit (deposit) of the leader and those of other competitor.
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Empirical Specification
For the first analysis, we use a general specification that allows
From (7) and (8), we have basic understanding that one bank’s lending (deposit) depends on its leader and other bank’s lending (deposit). Combining (7) and (8) with macroeconomics and
banking variables, where , the general specification can be represent as follows:
Xit = α + β1Xpt + |
(9) |
Xit is the amount of loan (deposit) of a particular bank i at t, Xpt is the amount of loan (deposit) supplied by the leader,
Competition and |
25 |
The possible key hypotheses on Equation (9) are as follows: 1. If β1 < 0 and β2 < 0, it indicates that the leader and other competitor are significant to affect bank’s quantity of credit/ deposit; 2. If β1 < 0 and β2 = 0, then the market is indicated to be consistent to leaderfollower relationship (i.e. Stackleberg competition). 3. If β2 < 0, β1 = 0, then the market is indicated to be consistent with Cournot model, or it can be inferred that there is no leader exist. 4. If β1 > 0 and/or β2 > 0 , it may indicate other form of competition that is not usually predicted.
Control variables, the “panel variant” or “panel invariant” factors consists of macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation, exchange rates, and benchmark interest rates), specific internal bank variables
We use two approaches to estimate Equation (9), namely: 1. the standard panel fixed effect methodology to absorb
3.2. Grouping of Observations
Observations consist of monthly data of 119 banks listed in Indonesia. The main data source are Bank Indonesia and CEIC. Observations are grouped based on an identification of whether banks compete on a relevant market, where the products across banks have a high degree of interchangeability. This step is crucial as competition is the central issue in this paper. To facilitate this matter, on estimations on credit market we use degree of similarity on credit across economic sectors between each bank and the leader candidate, using the following formula:
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K |
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Xi = |
Σ |
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xik |
- |
xIk |
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(10) |
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Σk xik |
Σk xIk |
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k |
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xik is bank i’s lending on sector k, and xIk is bank leader’s lending on the corresponding sector. This formula was modified and inversed from trade complementary index (Michaely, 1996), which is used generally in international trade analysis. The leader candidates are Bank A, Bank B, Bank C, Bank D, and Bank E.
Similarly, for estimations on deposits, we use degree of similarity on deposit spatially (i.e. individual bank’s deposit distribution across provinces) between each bank and its leader candidate, using following representation:
26Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
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M |
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Xi = |
Σ |
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xim |
- |
xIm |
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(11) |
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Σk xim |
Σk xIm |
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m |
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xim is bank i’s deposits on province m, and xIm is the leader’s quantity of deposits on the corresponding province.
Each group estimates applies to a group of observations that consists of 30 banks with the lowest value of Xi. As we have 5 suspected leaders (Bank A, B, C, D, E), then we have 5 groups (Group A, B, C, D, E, respectively) to estimate. In addition, we conduct estimation using all observations as a robustness test for omitted variable bias regarding omitted competitors across groups. To note, for
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 4.1. Credit Market
The results of fixed effect panel regression (Table
Table 1.
Fixed Effect Panel Estimation for Credit
|
Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
|
Group D |
Group E |
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VARIABLES |
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Leader Credit |
||||||
|
(0.00799) |
(0.0232) |
(0.0307) |
(0.00923) |
(0.0148) |
|
Follower Credit |
0.0961 |
0.0209 |
0.215 |
0.375 |
||
|
(0.204) |
(0.168) |
(0.253) |
(0.285) |
(0.345) |
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CONTROL |
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VARIABLES |
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1. Macroeconomics |
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GDP, inflation rate, interbank rate, |
exchange rate |
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2. Structural |
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HHI, credit diversification, credit |
to PDB ratio |
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3. Internal bank |
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NP L, CAR, BOPO |
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Constant |
||||||
|
(1.107) |
(1.601) |
(1.236) |
(1.196) |
(3.170) |
|
Observations |
420 |
525 |
525 |
525 |
525 |
|
0.902 |
0.862 |
0.914 |
0.900 |
0.720 |
||
Number of bank |
12 |
15 |
15 |
15 |
15 |
|
Hausman Prob |
0.008 |
0.099 |
0.093 |
|
0.000 |
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Dependent variable: Log (Credit) (…) = Robust standard errors
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Competition and |
27 |
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Table 2. |
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Dynamic Panel Estimation for Credit |
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Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
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Group D |
Group E |
Full Sample |
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VARIABLES |
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Leader Credit |
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(0.0263) |
(0.0184) |
(0.0197) |
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(0.0680) |
(0.0108) |
|
(0.121) |
Follower Credit |
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0.163 |
|||||
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(0.0414) |
(0.0521) |
(0.0419) |
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(0.0942) |
(0.0541) |
|
(0.138) |
CONTROL |
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VARIABLES |
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1. Macroeconomics |
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GDP, inflation rate, |
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2. Structural |
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HHI, credit diversification , credit to PDB ratio |
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3. Internal bank |
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NPL, CAR, BOPO |
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Constant |
|
0.983*** |
0.997*** |
0.992*** |
|
0.983*** |
0.970*** |
0.965*** |
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(0.00495) |
(0.00595) |
(0.0102) |
|
(0.00611) |
(0.0105) |
(0.00647) |
|
Observations |
|
913 |
945 |
945 |
|
832 |
840 |
|
3,521 |
Number of bank |
|
27 |
27 |
27 |
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26 |
24 |
|
105 |
Sargan test prob |
|
0.331 |
0.278 |
0.212 |
|
0.267 |
0.514 |
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0.898 |
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AR(2) prob |
|
0.967 |
0.762 |
0.393 |
|
0.105 |
0.413 |
|
0.110 |
Dependent variable: Log(Credit) |
(…) = Robust standard errors |
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Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dynamic panel data for credit indicates a
Bank C and Bank B groups follows Stackleberg and Cournot competition model simultaneously. The highest response to the leader’s decision is indicated on the group of banks with Bank D as the leader. GDP have positive impact with short term elasticity 0.14 – 0.30. Interbank money market rate and NPL variables are negative, tends to be inelastic. The lag dependent parameters are estimated below unity, thus indicate dynamic stability.
4.2. Deposit Market
The fixed effect panel data regression shows that a
28Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
Table 3
Fixed Effect Panel Estimation for Deposit
|
Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
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Group D |
Group E |
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VARIABLES |
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Leader deposits |
||||||
|
(0.138) |
(0.0421) |
(0.103) |
(0.127) |
(0.0639) |
|
Follower deposits |
||||||
|
(0.426) |
(0.316) |
(0.390) |
(0.562) |
(0.461) |
|
CONTROL |
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VARIABLES |
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1. Macroeconomics |
|
GDP, inflation rate, interbank rate, |
exchange rate |
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2. Structural |
|
HHI, credit diversification, credit |
to PDB ratio |
|
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3. Internal bank |
|
NPL, CAR, BOPO |
|
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Constant |
17.76** |
14.50*** |
8.653*** |
23.26*** |
4.441 |
|
|
(6.755) |
(3.571) |
(2.630) |
(3.152) |
(7.023) |
|
Observations |
391 |
408 |
408 |
380 |
403 |
|
0.430 |
0.558 |
0.493 |
0.526 |
0.271 |
||
Number of bank |
12 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
14 |
|
Hausman Prob. |
0.000 |
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|
0.029 |
Dependent variable: Log(Deposits) |
(…) = Robust standard errors |
|
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Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In general, dynamic panel regression indicates that Stackleberg and Cournot competition models apply simultaneously for all group estimates and
The highest response occurs on the group of banks with Bank D as the leader (i.e. Group D), where 10% increase on Bank D’s deposit will be responded by, on average, 3.6% decrease
Table 4.
Dynamic Panel Estimation for Bank’s Deposit
|
Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
|
Group D |
Group E |
Full Sample |
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VARIABLES |
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Leader deposits |
|
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|
(0.0541) |
(0.0419) |
(0.0455) |
|
(0.0711) |
(0.0402) |
(0.128) |
Follower deposits |
|
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|
(0.0860) |
(0.0851) |
(0.116) |
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(0.0900) |
(0.170) |
(0.0582) |
CONTROL |
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VARIABLES |
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1. Macroeconomics |
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GDP, inflation rate, interbank k rate, exchange rate |
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2. Structural |
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HHI, credit diversification, credit to PDB ratio |
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3. Internal bank |
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NPL, CA R, BOPO |
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Lag dependent |
0.989*** |
0.991*** |
0.992*** |
|
0.999*** |
0.937*** |
0.988*** |
|
(0.00834) |
(0.00797) |
(0.00968) |
|
(0.0122) |
(0.0250) |
(0.0171) |
Observations |
798 |
822 |
774 |
|
846 |
754 |
3,212 |
Number of bank |
25 |
25 |
25 |
|
25 |
26 |
106 |
Sargan Test Prob |
0.228 |
0.202 |
0.363 |
|
0.181 |
0.569 |
0.147 |
Arellano Bond |
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AR(2) prob |
0.512 |
0.632 |
0.733 |
|
0.515 |
0.394 |
0.429 |
Dependent variable: Log (deposits) (…) = Robust standard errors
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Competition and |
29 |
on follower’s deposit. GDP have positive impact to deposit variables.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The estimation results suggest a leader and follower relationship among banks on most of the grouped observations, although with some variations in magnitude. Generally, competition between followers is insignificant on credit market, but is significant on deposit market. Leader and follower competition result can be viewed on Table 3 below. Control variables, such as: GDP, inflation rate, interbank rate, exchange rate, HHI, credit diversification, credit to PDB ratio, and operational bank ratios are generally show consistent parameters as expected.
Table 5.
Group Summary
|
Panel Data |
Lending |
Deposit |
|
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|
|
|
|
Fixed Effect |
|
Competition |
Stackleberg, |
Stackleberg and Cournot, |
|
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Except Group C |
Except Group C and Group A |
|
Highest Response |
Group B |
Group D |
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Competition |
Stackleberg with Cournot |
Stackleberg and Cournot |
|
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for Group C and Group B |
|
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Highest Response |
Group D and Group B |
Group D |
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Competition |
Stackleberg |
Stackleberg and Cournot |
|
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simultaneously |
|
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Although our results indicate that
30Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
References
Adams, Robert M. and Dean F. Amel (2011). Market structure and the
Amidu, Mohammed and Simon Wolfe (2013). The effect of banking market structure on the lending channel: Evidence from emerging markets. Review of Financial Economics, 22:
Angelini, Paolo dan Nicola Cetorelli (2003). The Effects of Regulatory Reform on
Competition in the Banking Industry, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 35,
No. 5:
Arellano, M., and S. Bond. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58:
Ariefianto, M.D. (2009). Perilaku Persaingan Industri Perbankan Di Indonesia Pasca Krisis, Analisa Dengan Pendekatan Teori Oligopoli Dan Ekonometrika Panel Data
Borio, C. and Fritz, W. (1995). The response of
Claessens, Stijn and Luc Laeven (2004). What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36 (3):
Cottarelli, C. and Kourelis, A. (1994). Financial structure, bank lending rates and the transmission of monetary policy, IMF Staff Paper, 42:
Freixas X. and
Gunji , Hiroshi, Kazuki Miura and Yuan Yuan (2009). Bank competition and monetary policy, Japan and the World Economy, 21:
Klein, Michael A. (1971). A Theory of the Banking Firm. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 3(2):
Olivero, María Pía, Yuan Li, and Bang Nam Jeon (2011). Competition in banking and the lending channel: Evidence from
Roodman, D. (2009). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. The Stata Journal, 9 (1):
Competition and |
31 |
Van Leuvensteijn, Michiel (2013). Impact of bank competition on the interest rate passthrough in the Euro area, Applied Economics, 45:
32Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
Appendix
Table 1.
List and Notes of Dataset
Variables |
Source |
Notes |
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Main Variables |
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Credit |
Bank Indonesia |
Total credit of individual bank data |
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Deposit |
Bank Indonesia |
Total deposit of individual bank data |
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Credit/deposit of the leader |
Bank Indonesia |
5 banks as candidate (Bank A, B, C, D, E) |
|
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Credit/deposit of the followers |
Bank Indonesia, authors’ |
Industry data – data on a particular bank observed |
|
calculation. |
|
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Macroeconomics |
|
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GDP |
CEIC |
Nominal, interpolated to monthly using quadratic |
|
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match sum |
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Inflasi |
CEIC |
|
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|
Interest rate |
CEIC, Bank Indonesia |
Interbank call money |
|
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Exchange rates |
CEIC |
|
Industry |
|
|
HHI |
Bank Indonesia, authors’ |
Using credit/deposit approach |
|
calculation. |
|
Credit to GDP ratio |
Authors’ calculation |
As a proxy to indicate the industry |
Internal Bank |
|
significance on the economy |
NPL |
Bank Indonesia |
|
CAR |
Bank Indonesia |
Share of credit with quality 3 to 5 |
BOPO |
Bank Indonesia |
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Credit to asset ratio |
Bank Indonesia, |
Operational cost / revenues |
|
authors’ calculation |
As a proxy to indicate business diversification |
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Competition and |
33 |
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Table 2. |
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Fixed Effect Estimates on Credit Market |
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Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
Group D |
Group E |
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VARIABLES |
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Kredit leader |
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|
(0.00799) |
(0.0232) |
(0.0307) |
(0.00923) |
(0.0148) |
|
Kredit follower |
|
0.0961 |
0.0209 |
0.215 |
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0.375 |
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(0.204) |
(0.168) |
(0.253) |
(0.285) |
(0.345) |
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Variabel kontrol |
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1. Makroekonomi |
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PDB |
|
1.041*** |
1.124*** |
1.185*** |
0.908*** |
0.933*** |
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(0.236) |
(0.208) |
(0.230) |
(0.280) |
(0.199) |
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Inflasi |
|
0.000500 |
0.000488 |
||||
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(0.00135) |
(0.00298) |
(0.00200) |
(0.00164) |
(0.00417) |
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Suku bunga PUAB |
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(0.00556) |
(0.0113) |
(0.00652) |
(0.00935) |
(0.0231) |
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Real Exchange Rate |
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|
(0.0836) |
(0.0730) |
(0.0575) |
(0.131) |
(0.105) |
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2. Struktural |
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HHI |
|
0.000980 |
0.00102** |
||||
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(0.000411) |
(0.000663) |
(0.000437) |
(0.000573) |
(0.000646) |
|
Diversifikasi |
|
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|
|
(0.0459) |
(0.0688) |
(0.0324) |
(0.0454) |
(0.0813) |
|
Rasio kredit/PDB |
|
0.0694*** |
0.0685*** |
0.107*** |
0.0661*** |
|
0.144* |
|
|
(0.0180) |
(0.0209) |
(0.0190) |
(0.0150) |
(0.0695) |
|
3. Internal bank |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NPL |
|
||||||
|
|
(0.00648) |
(0.00416) |
(0.00826) |
(0.00151) |
(0.00956) |
|
CAR |
|
0.000721 |
|||||
|
|
(0.00162) |
(0.00362) |
(0.00376) |
(0.00669) |
||
BOPO |
|
0.000229 |
0.000250** |
0.000244 |
|||
|
|
(0.000271) |
(0.000165) |
(0.000200) |
(0.000514) |
||
Constant |
|
|
|||||
|
|
(1.107) |
(1.795) |
(1.236) |
(1.196) |
(4.673) |
|
Observations |
|
420 |
525 |
525 |
525 |
|
525 |
|
0.902 |
0.862 |
0.914 |
0.900 |
|
0.720 |
|
Number of bank |
|
12 |
15 |
15 |
15 |
|
15 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
34Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
Table 3.
Dynamic Panel Estimates on Credit Market
|
Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
Group D |
Group E |
Full Sample |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Variabel |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Kredit leader |
||||||
|
(0.0263) |
(0.0184) |
(0.0197) |
(0.0680) |
(0.0108) |
(0.314) |
Kredit follower |
0.00843 |
0.642* |
||||
|
(0.0414) |
(0.0521) |
(0.0419) |
(0.0942) |
(0.0541) |
(0.365) |
Variabel kontrol |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Makroekonomi |
|
|
|
|
|
|
PDB |
0.131** |
0.205*** |
0.305*** |
0.189*** |
0.144** |
0.0970 |
|
(0.0545) |
(0.0632) |
(0.0545) |
(0.0487) |
(0.0731) |
(0.0847) |
Inflasi |
0.00279* |
0.000804 |
0.00250*** |
0.00178 |
||
|
(0.00148) |
(0.000889) |
(0.000825) |
(0.000915) |
(0.00163) |
(0.00165) |
Suku bunga PUAB |
||||||
|
(0.00643) |
(0.00449) |
(0.00513) |
(0.00474) |
(0.00759) |
(0.00640) |
Exchange Rate |
0.0374 |
|||||
|
(0.0698) |
(0.0492) |
(0.0541) |
(0.0486) |
(0.0812) |
(0.0473) |
2. Struktural |
|
|
|
|
|
|
HHI |
0.00055*** |
0.00075*** |
0.00104** |
|||
|
(0.000280) |
(0.000202) |
(0.000188) |
(0.000211) |
(0.000321) |
(0.000522) |
Rasio kredit/PDB |
0.00409* |
0.000956 |
0.00460 |
0.00719*** |
0.00609 |
0.00516** |
|
(0.00241) |
(0.00156) |
(0.00402) |
(0.00222) |
(0.00457) |
(0.00248) |
Diversifikasi |
0.00464 |
0.0120*** |
0.0174*** |
|||
|
(0.0111) |
(0.00459) |
(0.00584) |
(0.00380) |
(0.00496) |
(0.00350) |
3. Internal bank |
|
|
|
|
|
|
BOPO |
||||||
|
(0.000197) |
(0.000125) |
(0.000152) |
(0.000155) |
(0.000154) |
(0.000102) |
NPL |
0.00305 |
|||||
|
(0.00128) |
(0.00157) |
(0.00208) |
(0.00139) |
(0.00379) |
(0.00643) |
CAR |
0.00113** |
0.000980 |
||||
|
(0.000243) |
(0.000526) |
(0.000717) |
(0.000722) |
(0.000310) |
|
Lag dependen |
0.983*** |
0.997*** |
0.992*** |
0.983*** |
0.970*** |
0.986*** |
|
(0.00495) |
(0.00595) |
(0.0102) |
(0.00611) |
(0.0105) |
(0.00939) |
Observations |
913 |
945 |
945 |
832 |
840 |
3,319 |
Number of bank |
27 |
27 |
27 |
26 |
24 |
105 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Competition and |
35 |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table 4. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fixed Effect Estimates on Deposit Market |
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
Group D |
Group E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VARIABLES |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DPK leader |
|
||||||
|
|
(0.138) |
(0.0421) |
(0.103) |
(0.127) |
(0.0639) |
|
DPK follower |
|
||||||
|
|
(0.426) |
(0.316) |
(0.390) |
(0.562) |
(0.461) |
|
Variabel kontrol |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Makroekonomi |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PDB |
|
0.222 |
1.078*** |
1.575*** |
1.580** |
2.199*** |
|
|
|
(0.336) |
(0.301) |
(0.429) |
(0.628) |
(0.523) |
|
Inflasi |
|
||||||
|
|
(0.0107) |
(0.00277) |
(0.00690) |
(0.00314) |
(0.00569) |
|
Suku bunga PUAB |
|
0.179** |
0.0574*** |
0.0312 |
0.128*** |
||
|
|
(0.0788) |
(0.0140) |
(0.0207) |
(0.0154) |
(0.0331) |
|
Exchange Rate |
|
0.0575 |
|||||
|
|
(0.235) |
(0.158) |
(0.228) |
(0.204) |
(0.443) |
|
2. Struktural |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
HHI |
|
||||||
|
|
(0.00166) |
(0.00118) |
(0.00170) |
(0.00127) |
(0.00437) |
|
Diversifikasi |
|
0.124*** |
0.215*** |
0.0191 |
0.0762*** |
0.0228*** |
|
|
|
(0.0307) |
(0.0443) |
(0.0610) |
(0.0216) |
(0.00370) |
|
Rasio kredit/PDB |
|
0.164*** |
0.121*** |
0.105*** |
0.165*** |
|
0.418 |
|
|
(0.0395) |
(0.0273) |
(0.0331) |
(0.0367) |
(0.270) |
|
3. Internal bank |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NPL |
|
0.00186 |
0.0156 |
0.00430 |
|||
|
|
(0.0246) |
(0.0141) |
(0.0172) |
(0.0154) |
(0.0314) |
|
CAR |
|
0.00509*** |
|||||
|
|
(0.000583) |
(0.00454) |
(0.00414) |
(0.000869) |
(0.00386) |
|
BOPO |
|
0.000440 |
0.000648 |
0.000629 |
|||
|
|
(0.000889) |
(0.000387) |
(0.000605) |
(0.000538) |
(0.000194) |
|
Constant |
|
17.76** |
14.50*** |
8.653*** |
23.26*** |
|
4.441 |
|
|
(6.755) |
(3.571) |
(2.630) |
(3.152) |
(7.023) |
|
Observations |
|
391 |
408 |
408 |
380 |
|
403 |
|
0.430 |
0.558 |
0.493 |
0.526 |
|
0.271 |
|
Number of bank |
|
12 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
|
14 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
36Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
Table 5.
Dynamic Panel Estimates on Deposit Market
|
Group A |
Group B |
Group C |
Group D |
Group E |
Full Sample |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VARIABLES |
|
|
|
|
|
|
DPK leader |
||||||
|
(0.0541) |
(0.0419) |
(0.0455) |
(0.0711) |
(0.0402) |
(0.128) |
DPK follower |
||||||
|
(0.0860) |
(0.0851) |
(0.116) |
(0.0900) |
(0.170) |
(0.0582) |
Variabel kontrol |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Makroekonomi |
|
|
|
|
|
|
PDB |
0.857*** |
0.394*** |
0.643*** |
0.652*** |
0.903*** |
0.776*** |
|
(0.0963) |
(0.114) |
(0.153) |
(0.156) |
(0.188) |
(0.218) |
Inflasi |
0.00259 |
0.00409* |
0.00252 |
0.00539** |
||
|
(0.00269) |
(0.00240) |
(0.00231) |
(0.00262) |
(0.00609) |
(0.00315) |
Suku bunga PUAB |
0.0161** |
0.0328*** |
0.0149* |
0.0602** |
0.0380** |
|
|
(0.00799) |
(0.0110) |
(0.00837) |
(0.0109) |
(0.0236) |
(0.0190) |
Exchange Rate |
0.419*** |
0.351* |
0.240 |
|||
|
(0.0856) |
(0.123) |
(0.0966) |
(0.119) |
(0.196) |
(0.169) |
2. Struktural |
|
|
|
|
|
|
HHI |
||||||
|
(0.000461) |
(0.000462) |
(0.000495) |
(0.000591) |
(0.00118) |
(0.00114) |
Rasio kredit/PDB |
0.00301 |
0.00318 |
0.00245 |
0.00505 |
0.0763** |
0.00844 |
|
(0.00209) |
(0.00253) |
(0.00234) |
(0.00532) |
(0.0344) |
(0.00541) |
Diversifikasi |
0.00949* |
0.0133 |
||||
|
(0.00519) |
(0.00768) |
(0.00516) |
(0.0124) |
(0.00194) |
(0.00154) |
3. Internal bank |
|
|
|
|
|
|
BOPO |
0.000596 |
0.000765** |
0.000229 |
0.000398 |
0.000542* |
0.00101* |
|
(0.000379) |
(0.000366) |
(0.000344) |
(0.000506) |
(0.000327) |
(0.000590) |
NPL |
0.0109 |
|||||
|
(0.00261) |
(0.00158) |
(0.00150) |
(0.00532) |
(0.0129) |
(0.00853) |
CAR |
0.000204 |
0.000230 |
0.00778*** |
|||
|
(0.000298) |
(0.000292) |
(0.000355) |
(0.000396) |
(0.00117) |
(0.000680) |
Lag dependen |
0.989*** |
0.991*** |
0.992*** |
0.999*** |
0.937*** |
0.988*** |
|
(0.00834) |
(0.00797) |
(0.00968) |
(0.0122) |
(0.0250) |
(0.0171) |
Observations |
798 |
822 |
774 |
846 |
754 |
3,212 |
Number of bank |
25 |
25 |
25 |
25 |
26 |
106 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Competition and |
37 |
Graph 1. Credit Market: Dynamic Panel Actual Vs. Fitted Values
Graph 2. Deposit Market: Dynamic Panel Actual Vs. Fitted Values
38Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
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