Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 333
Nexus of Competition and Stability:
Case of Banking in Indonesia
Tri Mulyaningsih
Anne Daly
Riyana Miranti1
Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between banking competition and banking stability in Indonesia, where the bank lending is the major source of funding on this country with a series of structural changes including deregulation, economic crisis, and consolidation. We apply generalized method of moment approach on individual bank data, and the result shows that competitive banking will increase the economic stability. Under a competitive industry, banks must improve their efficiency, increase their loans disbursement, diversify their business, boost their assets and enhance their capitalization. This paper emphasize that the efficiency is a critical to reduce risk, both for large and small banks. Furthermore, regardless their size, an adequate capital is an important factor for the bank to cope with shocks in the market.
Keywords: Bank competition, stability, GMM.
JEL Classification: G21; G28; D43
1Tri Mulyaningsih (corresponding author) is lecture at Faculty of Economic and Business, Sebelas Maret Surakarta University (trimulyaningsih.uns@gmail.com; tri.mulyaningsih@uns.ac.id); Anne Daly is lecturer at Faculty of Business, Government and Law, University of Canberra (anne.daly@canberra.edu.au); Riyana Miranti is researcher at National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling, University of Canberra, (riyana.miranti@canberra.edu.au).
334Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, Volume 18, Number 3, January 2016
I. INTRODUCTION
The current consolidation policy of the Indonesian Banking Architecture aims to create an industry with fewer banks (Bank Indonesia, 2008; Rosengard & Prasetyantoko, 2011). Following the banking crisis in 1997, Indonesia continues consolidating the banking industry and widening the access for foreign penetration to the local banking industry. Banking consolidating rather than deregulation is perceived to be capable of creating a strong and stable industry (Bank Indonesia, 2008). Through consolidation, banks will have a larger capital base that enables them to maintain their business and control risks, develop information technology, and increase the scale to support the expansion of credit capacity. In order to encourage banks to be better capitalized, banks had to comply with a higher minimum requirement for base capital of 100 billion Rupiah by 2010. To increase capital, banks are allowed to receive additional capital injections from existing owners, merge with other banks, be acquired by bigger banks, or sell their shares on the capital market in order (Bank Indonesia, 2008). Meanwhile, recently banking market entry was tightened with a minimum capital of Rp3 trillion (US$335 million) compared to 50 billion Rupiah for commercial banks and 100 billion for joint venture banks in 1992. According to the Indonesian Banking Architecture, banking consolidation is planned to reduce the number of banks by half to 121 banks in 2010 and to
This study contributes to the discussion of the relationship between competition and stability in the banking industry particularly in the context of developing countries. Turk Ariss (2010, p. 776) underlines the importance of conducting studies in developing countries where capital markets are relatively underdeveloped, and banks represent the main providers of credit to the economy. In addition, Indonesian banking is a rich laboratory because it experienced banking deregulation, at least one banking distress and one banking crises in the 1990s, and currently is exposed to consolidation and increased foreign penetration. Moreover, this study focuses on the stability (insolvency) of the individual banks rather than on stability of the banking system as a whole, in order to recognize any bank failure that may occur without the banking system experiencing systemic strain (Schaeck & Cihak, 2007, p. 4). Furthermore, this study takes into account the possibility of the endogeneity of competition and banking stability by employing the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) (Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Liu, Molyneux,
&Wilson, 2013; Schaeck & Cihak, 2007; Soedarmono, Machrouh, & Tarazi, 2011). The GMM approach produces robust estimation of the distribution of error and produces efficient estimates because it takes into accounts heteroscedasticity (Soedarmono et al., 2011). The GMM manages the endogeneity problem by employing an instrumental variables approach.
Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 335
II. THEORY
There is extensive literature discussing the
On the contrary, the second group of studies argues that there is no
Some studies highlight the existence of the “too big to fail” hypothesis in the banking industry. In a less competitive market with few large banks, the regulator will not let large banks fail. This creates a moral hazard for the large banks that may take excessive risks as they assume that the authorities will not let them fail (Caminal & Matutes, 2002; Mishkin, 1996). Therefore, where there are large banks in a concentrated industry, there may be more instability because of the moral hazard problem. Studies of the Indonesian banking industry, particularly during the 1997 crisis, indicated that the “too big to fail” hypothesis was relevant for explaining Indonesian banking history (Fane & McLeod, 2002; Pangestu, 2003). The government decision to bail out “troubled banks” in the early 1990, for example Bappindo (the
336Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, Volume 18, Number 3, January 2016
the 1997 crisis, large banks were predominantly insolvent thus they were either being closed, nationalized or jointly recapitalized (Fane & McLeod, 2002)2. As the result of implicit government guarantees, particularly for large banks, taking excessive risk was a moral hazard.
The least competitive banking system is more fragile because there is a lack of market discipline to motivate banks to improve their efficiency. Berger and Hannan (1998) argued that in addition to
Laeven (2005) and Margono, Sharma, and Melvin Ii (2010) reveal that Indonesian banking is associated with higher risk and less competition than other East Asian countries. Margono et al. (2010) found that the efficiency level was lower post the 1997 crisis. Based on their observation prior crisis, between 1993 and 1997, the Indonesian banking system had a comparable level of efficiency (78.7 per cent) as other countries (Turkish, Korea, European countries). As a comparison, the cost efficiency of Turkish banks averaged 75.7 per cent (Kasman, 2010) and the efficiency of Korean banks was 89.0 per cent between 1985 and 1995 (Hao, Hunter, & Yang, 2001) and that of European banks ranged from 66.9 per cent to 88.9 per cent (Vennet, 2002). However, post the 1997, Margono et al. (2010) estimated that the cost efficiency was
53.4per cent3. The efficiency level post crisis was lower than that prior to the crisis because on average the increase in efficiency was higher prior crisis than
2“Based on the assessment from the central bank and the international monetary fund, 73 private banks that were classified in March1999 as category A (not needing further immediate action in relation to capital adequacy) had an average market share of 0.07 percent each, whereas the other 84 in existence just prior to the crisis (which have all been either closed, nationalized, or jointly recapitalized) were more than seven times larger, with an average market share of 0.50 per cent each” (Fane & McLeod 2002, p. 289).
3The cost efficiency estimation employed the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach (Margono, Sharma and Melvin Li 2010).
4According to Margono, Sharma and Melvin Ii (2010) the increase in efficiency on average was 1.4% from 1998 through 2000 as opposed to 6.3% from 1993 to 1997.
Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 337
Finally, an empirical
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Measures of Banking Instability
This study uses
The
1
where ROA is the rate of return on assets, EQ is the ratio of equity to assets and σ (ROA) is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of return (Boyd et al., 2006), i refers to bank i and t refers to time t. The above formulation implies that
338Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, Volume 18, Number 3, January 2016
variation of capital and profitability driven by the changes in the internal bank condition, but also the variation that is driven by the external environment (Schaeck & Cihak, 2007).
3.2. Measures of Competitive Banking
This study employed the ). The interaction variables are the multiplication of input prices variables and years dummies.
2
where TR is the bank revenue; w represents three input prices which are the funding price, the wage or personnel costs and the capital price; BSF are
3.3.Empirical Model for Estimating the
The literature suggests that there may a possible endogeneity of the measures of the degree of banking competition. Endogeneity occurs when the causality is reversed, particularly
Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 339
when the degree of competition depends on loan risk, overall bank risk and the capitalization level (Berger, Klapper, &
To address possible endogeneity, this study considers employment of the instrumental variable technique of GMM, Generalized
This study employed four variables which are the degree of market concentration and the degree of openness in the banking industry for example the penetration of foreign banks, the domination of government banks and the dummy of banking reforms. As discussed by Berger et al. (2009) and Schaeck and Cihak (2007) the degree of openness is a critical measure of banking freedom. The degree of market concentration is measured by the
3
where i and t refer to bank and time index respectively. The table below provides comprehensive information on the definition of dependent and explanatory variables.
5Berger, Klapper and
340Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, Volume 18, Number 3, January 2016
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IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
As discussed previously in the empirical method, the main estimation uses the
For the measure of banking competition,
Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 341
uses the
In order to test the robustness of the above findings, this study estimated the same specification of equation three by using a different data set. The first dataset comprises large and
The empirical findings show that there was no
The following is a discussion of the role of bank specific factors, the level of development and the macroeconomic environment in enhancing banking stability. Business diversity and loans disbursement contributed to reducing risk. A higher income generated from the non- interest based activities and a higher loans disbursement reduced profit volatility and enhanced capitalization. Banks were more specialized in disbursing loans thus they had better screening and monitoring so it lowered the
342Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, Volume 18, Number 3, January 2016
a higher LDR was associated with a higher risk. Banks with higher LDR were more likely to have a liquidity problem than banks with lower LDR (Soedarmono et al., 2011).
Regarding the macroeconomic environment, currency depreciation is associated with bank insolvency as shown in the estimation one, even though it was only significant by using 90 per cent of confidence interval. This may reflect that the exchange rate was only freely floating for about half of the estimation period6. Currency devaluations contributed to increased banks risk because it poses a threat to bank profitability
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6Indonesia changed the exchange rate regime from a managed foreign exchange regime to
Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 343
The pressure on liquidity extended to banks’ profitability as banks experienced loss more than 100 trillion Rupiah in 1998. As banks’ equity was not capable of covering the losses so banks were being insolvent. In 1998 banks’ equity dropped to more than minus 160 trillion Rupiah in 1998. In addition, estimations number two, three and four show that currency depreciation was associated with lower profits, larger profit volatility and lower capitalization.
The following discussion explores the contribution of a competitive banking system to reducing risk. Empirical findings presented in Table two show that competitive banking enhanced profits, reduced profit volatility and increased capitalization. Under a competitive banking system, banks have to enhance their capability in order to survive in a more challenging environment. Banks must improve their efficiency, increase their loans disbursement, diversify their business, and boost their assets to enable banks in generating higher profits. In the case of large banks, improving efficiency is also important to have less volatile profits. Regarding small banks, the increase in loans disbursement is associated with lower profit volatility because banks have better screening and monitoring of the loans. Finally, a competitive banking system puts pressure on banks to be better capitalized. This finding agrees with previous studies, for example Schaeck and Cihak (2007), Berger et al. (2009), Soedarmono et al. (2011) and Beck et al. (2013).
The data shows that large banks had a higher insolvency risk compared to smaller banks. The means of the
36.61.The average
Further exploration of the source of bank risk across banks of different sizes shows that banks were exposed to larger risk as their assets grew. An increase in loans disbursement contributed to the growth of assets. Larger banks had a more challenging situation because they had a lower access to cheap sources of funds from deposits. The composition of banks liabilities prior and during the 1997 banking crisis reveals that small banks had a greater access to cheap funds as 70 per cent of banks liabilities were in the form of deposits. In addition, small banks had a lower level of borrowing by 12 per cent compared to larger banks. Within large and
344Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, Volume 18, Number 3, January 2016
banks experienced maturity mismatches7. It further increased the demand on overseas funding particularly for the large banks. Large banks benefitted in accessing overseas loans because the creditors preferred to disburse loans to banks with
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The empirical results also suggest that the insolvency risk is higher if banks have a lower level of capitalization and are inefficient. The level of capitalization is particularly relevant to explain the higher insolvency risk of the large banks. The estimation results and the data show that large banks had a higher insolvency risk because they had lower capitalization compared to small banks. Banks must have adequate capital if they face more challenging business. Furthermore, the estimation of competition and stability across banks with different sizes suggest that lower efficiency contributed to increase insolvency risk. In this study, efficiency refers to technical efficiency that measures overhead cost by dividing the operating expenses to revenue. A high overhead cost contributed to lower profits, increased profit volatility and lowered capitalization. The findings were relevant for large banks and small banks. To sum up, all results presented in this study suggest that a competitive market enhanced banking stability. The estimations also show that the high overhead costs that reflects the efficiency
7Most deposits were
Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 345
level negatively contributed to stability. Furthermore, a competitive market induced banks to have a higher capitalization. Thus, by having a competitive banking system, banks are more efficient and stable.
In addition, the Indonesian banking industry was characterized by a variety of structural weaknesses, for example a high percentage of
Finally, the lack of competition within the banking industry was accompanied by a lack of competition in other parts of the financial industry. In the case of the Indonesian economy, the development of other financial institutions and the stock market has been much slower than the growth of the banking industry. Less developed
346Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, Volume 18, Number 3, January 2016
V. CONCLUSION
This paper concludes that competitive environment contributed to reducing banks’ insolvency risk. This result is robust across various model specifications and datasets. Banks in a competitive market have a higher profit and better capitalization. The empirical findings signal that there was no
The findings of this study underline the importance of competitive banking to maintain banking stability. Competitive markets induce banks to improve their efficiency, increase their lending and the level of capitalization. The current policies under the Indonesian Banking Architecture also aim to improve the level of capitalization. However, it is conducted by introducing a higher requirement on the minimum base capital and tightening conditions of entry to the industry. In addition, foreign penetration is encouraged under the mode of acquisition of local existing banks (foreign acquired banks) rather than establishing de novo banks. Moreover, the object of the current policies is to reduce the number of banks by half from 121 banks in 2010 to
The findings provide an alternative policy for the Indonesian banking industry. The policy should be directed to increase competition due to its contribution to increase the stability. The recent Global Financial Report of the World Bank strengthens the findings of this study that the evidence of the
Nexus of Competition and Stability : Case of Banking in Indonesia 347
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Beck, Thorsten, De Jonghe, Olivier dan Schepens, Glenn, “Bank competition and stability: Cross- country heterogeneity”. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2013, 22(2), hal.
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