Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2019), pp. 457 - 484
EFFECTIVENESS OF EARLY WARNING MODELS: A CRITICAL REVIEW AND NEW AGENDA FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Rakesh Padhan* and K.P. Prabheesh**
*Corresponding Author, Ph.D. Scholar, Indian Institute of Technology, Hyderabad, India. Email: la14m15p100002@iith.ac.in
**Associate Professor, Indian Institute of Technology, Hyderabad, India.
ABSTRACT
This paper suggests a new agenda for constructing early warning models (EWMs) to enhance their effectiveness in predicting financial crises. The central argument of the new agenda aims to eradicate the weaknesses of existing EWMs, since their failure to predict the global financial crisis of
1)the accurate measurement of a financial crisis, 2) implementation of a fourth- generation crisis model to capture the dynamic nature of the financial crisis, and 3) the inclusion of interconnectedness/contagion variables as explanatory variables for the financial crisis.
Keywords: Early warning models; Financial crisis; Contagion; Global financial crisis; Crisis generation models.
JEL Classifications: C00; F60; G01; G18; G21; H12.
Article history: |
|
Received |
: July 31, 2019 |
Revised |
: October 20, 2019 |
Accepted |
: November 27, 2019 |
Available Online: December 01, 2019
https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v22i4.1188
458 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
I. INTRODUCTION
Predicting financial crises1 has become the central motive and a huge challenging task for policymakers in the face of the enormous costs associated with frequent financial crises. The nature of financial crises generates great costs in terms of economic slowdown, output losses, widespread bankruptcies, unemployment, financial instability, a vicious circle of low credit and insolvency, and so on (e.g.Krugman, 1999; IMF, 2002; Hutchison and Noy, 2006; Claessens et al., 2012; Laeven and Valencia, 2012; Claessens and Kose, 2013; Pritsker, 2013). These forms of economic consequences further lead to loss of confidence among investors, which is a major cause of low investment and capital outflows. The consequences become even more dire with the joint occurrence of different crises. The latest example of a triple crisis2 is the global financial crisis in
Financial crises are costly in terms of depth and duration.3 Table 1 shows that, in terms of duration and cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) loss, the GFC, as a percentage, was more costly than all the financial events from 1880 to 2007. Apart from GDP loss, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) emphasize the problems with creditworthiness and bankruptcy spillover during a financial crisis. Claessens and Kose (2013) explain that the low ability to service debt can act as the seed for future crises, due to the collapse in output caused by the loss in creditworthiness. Similarly, Kaminsky et al. (1998) consider decreased credit ratings, loss of reserves, and increases in the cost of borrowing as crucial consequences of a financial crisis. Further, financial crises lead to sharp drops in real wages and employment and the deterioration of social and economic infrastructure (Gupta et al., 2003).
1Financial crises can be regarded as efficiency losses in the financial market and imbalances in the financial sector. These can take the form of sudden and stronger changes in the pricing and quantities of financial instruments, such as foreign exchanges, stocks, bills of exchange (Claessens and Kose, 2013).
2A triple crisis in year t can be defined as a banking crisis in year t combined with a currency crisis during the period [t - 1, t + 1] and a sovereign debt crisis during the period [t - 1, t + 1].
3Crisis depth is defined as the
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 459
Table 1.
Duration and Depth of Financial Crisis
This table provides a broad comparison of crises based on duration and depth, collected from Bordo et al. (2001) and Cecchetti et al. (2009). The average duration of crisis in an year is around 2.4, and the depth ranges from 5.2% to 20% during the costliest crises that occurred in the world from
|
Avg. Duration of Crisis in |
Avg. Crisis Depth (In terms |
|
Period/Events |
of cumulative GDP loss |
||
Years |
|||
|
relative to peak in percent) |
||
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
2.4 |
9.8 |
||
New York Panic of 1907) |
|
|
|
2.4 |
13.4 |
||
1.8 |
5.2 |
||
of the 1980sthe , ERM crisis of |
|
|
|
1992 , the Asian and Russian |
|
|
|
crisis of |
|
|
|
2.5 |
20 |
||
of 2008) |
|
|
In the mean time, two forms of globalization, trade and financial integration, have created fear among investors since the GFC due to the possibility of contagion.4 Given an integrated economy, the balance sheet channel assisted by the
4The word contagion means the spread of market disturbances observed through comovements in exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and capital flows.
5This hypothesis offers an explanation for contagion, wherein a financial crisis in one region is a
6The GFC originated in the United States, but became a global shock, whose consequences affected most economies. This event led the world economy into a recession and can be compared to the Great Depression of 1929. For more details, see Imbs (2010).
460 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
contagion had existed before 2008 in the consideration of contagious variables in policy action (Berg et al., 2004; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010), the major transition in the world economy caused by the GFC reignited the fear of financial contagion, motivating the search for instruments to recognize the signs.
To identify the leading indicators of a financial crisis, governments, banks, and international financial institutions have especially emphasized the construction of early warning models (EWMs)7 to fend against the crisis prior to its occurrence or to dampen the consequences if not completely avoided. However, these models were unable to predict the GFC (Davis and Karim, 2008; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2012; Christofides et al., 2016). In this context, the following questions arise: 1) Are current EWMs capable of predicting future financial events? 2) Will there be an ironic repetition of “this time is different”?8 3) Can crisis generation models capture the dynamic behavior of a financial crisis? 4) Do existing EWMs require augmentation?
The successful prediction of a financial crisis depends solely on the ability of EWMs to identify the leading indicators of financial turbulence. EWMs are needed to predict vulnerability events and are helpful in accurately framing warnings to predict whether an event will turn into a crisis or to minimize the consequences if an event cannot be completely avoided (IMF, 2010). The careful implementation of EWMs can be helpful in policy formulation in maintaining the stability of an economy. The development of an accurate and reliable EWM is a challenging task for policymakers to obtain an accurate signal to avoid the occurrence of financial turbulence or to mitigate the consequences. Greater EWM accuracy will result in lower costs associated with financial crisis, and vice versa. The failure of EWMs in predicting financial crises not only will have costly consequences, but will also raise questions about the efficiency of the EWMs themselves within their operating framework. However, the irony of this time being different has created more difficulty in the construction of EWMs for policymakers. Nonetheless, existing EWMs must be augmented to accurately predict financial crises. In this scenario, we propose a future agenda for constructing EWMs that could enhance their efficiency.
Our study is motivated by the incidence of the GFC, an event that the existing EWMs failed to forecast. First, the consequences of the failure of EWMs in predicting financial crises is more costly if the EWM fails to predict a crisis than if a crisis is predicted but does not occur (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006). If the event was predicted, then the economy will be aware of the future occurrence of the event and preventive measures are implemented prior to its occurrence. Conversely, if a crisis is not predicted, then the unnoticed occurrence of financial turbulence will have lead to the EWMs’ complete failure. In this case, the efficiency of EWMs is in doubt, since whether these models are really capable of predicting financial crises is in question (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010, 2011).
7The IMF (2002) explains early warning systems as an approach to the identification of vulnerabilities/ causative factors of financial crisis in the economy and useful in predicting future financial events.
8Every financial crisis is different by nature and difficult to identify by following past patterns of financial crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) explain this concept in more detail.
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 461
Second, theoretical crisis generation models also lose their predictive powers in identifying explanatory variables that effectively driven financial crises in the past. This demonstrates the existence of new variables that are not included among existing explanatory variables for financial crises. Further, a
Our approach in this study is as follows. First, we document the history of EWMs and their theoretical background. Second, we focus on the need for a new agenda in relation to the failure of the EWMs, the dynamic nature of financial crises, and the irony of this time being different. Finally, we propose a new agenda consisting of the need for hybrid measures of financial crisis, for a
In the line with this approach, we followed several steps: (1) We identify the literature related to EWMs. This search resulted in 62 papers in journals (IMF Economic Review, Journal of International Money and Finance, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Review of International Economics, International Journal of Finance and Economics, Journal of Financial Stability, Journal of Applied Economics, Journal of Applied Economics, Journal of Monetary Economics and Banking, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Surveys, Open Economic Review, Journal of Economic Perspectives, and American Economic Review), 19 working papers from international institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Bank for International Settlements, and the European Central Bank), seven chapters and discussion papers from banks and other financial institutions (the Czech National Bank and the National Bureau of Economic Research), four occasional and discussion papers (the Bank of Finland and the Reserve Bank of India), nine books from different publishers (MIT Press, University of Chicago Press, Princeton University Press, and the Institute for International Economics), one conference paper, and one PhD dissertation. This filter technique can be attributed to the steps of EWMs; the occurrence of the GFC, which weakened the predictive power of EWMs; and theoretical arguments for improving the efficiency of EWMs. (2) We focus on the reasons for the failure of EWMs in line with the GFC, the most costly financial event that ever occurred.
(3)Finally, we propose a future agenda for the construction of EWMs to overcome the lacuna associated with existing EWMs.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, this study could be the first attempt to document the history of EWMs with their theoretical background. Second, it is the first to propose a future agenda for the construction of EWMs based on the inclusion of all three stages. Third, the proposed agenda complements the ideas of the dynamic nature (Eichengreen, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a), joint occurrence (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), and financial
462 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
contagion (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010; Imbs, 2010) associated with financial crises. Finally, this study is in line with that of Claessens and Kose (2013) and Peltonen et al. (2015), who emphasize the nature of spillover/contagion as being appropriate in designing crisis mitigation and response policy and potentially enhancing the efficiency of EWMs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a brief overview of EWMs and their historical evolution. Section III demonstrates the need for a new agenda for the construction of EWMs for financial crises. Section IV presents the proposed agenda for the construction of EWMs. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF EWMS
Kindleberger (1978) introduces the EWM and attempts to determine its importance. Salant and Henderson (1978) then develop a model that can predict a financial crisis when speculator
The construction of an EWM involves three procedures. First, the primary step in formulating a model is to define financial crisis. Second, the explanatory variables are selected, that is, those variables that are very likely to lead a financial crisis if they cross a threshold. Finally, various econometric/statistical methodologies provide the models a finishing touch. Given all these stages, an EWM is thereby set to identify the leading indicators of a financial event.
EWMs face several challenges during their construction. First, defining a financial crisis is always difficult, because of the different forms of crisis in different countries over different periods (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Abiad, 2003). Second, the explanatory variables for the financial crisis must be identified, along with the underlying economic reasoning (Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld; 1986; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). Third, the appropriate choice of statistical/econometric methodology must be made or because that can alter the results.
A. Definitions of the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis can be classified into two broad categories, quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative category includes currency crises and sudden stops, where the crisis can be measured quantitatively. The qualitative category includes banking and debt crises, where the crisis can be measured using a judgmental definition (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). The literature on EWMs has suggested several definitions of financial crises, including currency crises (Frankel and Rose, 1996;
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 463
each other and emerge as a twin crisis9 (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) or triple crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b), which becomes difficult to define in a simple manner.
A1. Currency Crisis
A currency crisis is defined as a speculative attack on the foreign exchange value of a currency that either results in a sharp depreciation or forces the authorities to defend the currency by selling foreign exchange reserves or raising the domestic interest rate (Claessens and Kose, 2013). Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crisis as a normal depreciation of 25% or more that is at least 10% greater than the depreciation in the preceding year. Similarly,
A2. Sudden Stops
A financial crisis characterized by sudden stops is due to disruptions in the supply of external financing. This concept of sudden stops was first proposed by Calvo (1998) and is defined as a large and unexpected halt in the financing of the current account deficit, triggered by an systemic external event, such as a generalized increase in sovereign spreads throughout emerging markets. The author’s argument is that economies experiencing large current account deficits are potentially exposed to large and unexpected stops in the financing of the current account, or sudden stops. Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) identify the sudden reversal of capital flows as a potential cause of a liquidity crisis. Sudden stops can be captured by a spike in emerging market bond index spreads. Examples of sudden stops can be traced back to crisis events such as the Mexican crisis of 1994 (the tequila effect), the East Asian financial crisis of 1997– 1998, and the Russian crisis of 1998, where capital inflows ended with sudden stops and also resulted in capital outflow.
9A twin crisis in year t is a banking crisis in year t combined with a currency crisis during the period [t - 1, t + 1]. For more details, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
10The index of exchange rate market pressure is a weighted average of exchange rate changes and reserve changes. A financial crisis can be identified as when the index exceeds a
464 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
A3. Banking Crisis
In a systemic banking crisis, actual or potential bank runs11 and failures can induce banks to suspend the convertibility of their liabilities or compel the government to intervene to prevent this by extending liquidity and capital assistance on a large scale (Claessens and Kose, 2013). As a bank run starts, it generates its own momentum, leading to a
A4. Sovereign Debt Crisis
The inability or unwillingness to pay, that is, default, is the primary source of a debt crisis, which increases the probability of losing all the money that has been given to or invested in a country. In the absence of gunboat diplomacy,13 lenders cannot seize collateral from another country, or at least from a sovereign, if it refuses to pay its debt obligations. In the absence of an enforcement mechanism— that is, the analog of domestic bankruptcy, economic reasons, and the absence of legal arguments and so
11Bank runs arise because of panic, rather than a bank’s absolute insolvency. A run occurs when a large number of customers withdraw their deposits because they believe the bank is or could become insolvent (Simorangkir, 2006, 2011; Anwar and Ali, 2018).
12The bank run psychology is associated with bank runs, where the depositors are not willing to be the last person to withdraw money from the bank if they perceive vulnerability in the banking sector and the bank can default any time. This is more of a psychological than an economic phenomenon. equal weighting to influence the index. See Eichengreen et al. (1995) for an overview.
13Forcing a debtor to pay back a loan using threats about the consequences of or creating the circumstances for war is a bureaucratic political decision.
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 465
Currency crises have a close association with financial crises and are often associated with banking crises. The joint occurrence of a currency and a banking crisis together is called a twin crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), and if the twin crisis occurs together with a sovereign debt crisis, it becomes a triple crisis. Examples of twin crises include the crises in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea from 1997 to 1998, and the GFC comprised a triple event.
In the presence of multiple types of financial crisis, we use the broader term financial crisis in this paper because our objective is to frame an agenda for EWMs, with a focus on improving their effectiveness. The use of any different term will limit the concept of EWMs to a specific type of crisis. The use of the term financial crisis is in line with the occurrence of multiple financial events and the interlinkages among various financial events.
B. Potential Candidates for Explaining Financial Crisis: The Search for Regressors
The identification of explanatory variables for financial crises is the second step of EWM construction. The factors that determine a financial crisis can be derived theoretically, empirically, or both. Theoretical models suggest three generations of financial crisis models for the fundamental explanation of crises, while the empirical literature provides various variables related to financial crises.
B1.
The first theoretical model associated with financial crisis, popularly known as the
466 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
exchange rate, a decline in equity prices, a drop in exports, and a high ratio of broad money to international reserves to be major determinants of financial crisis.
The
B2.
After the failure of the
The
B3.
In the wake of the
14Arbitrage is the process of buying and selling the same product in different markets to reap the benefits from the price differential.
15Moral hazard is a phenomenon wherein borrowers engage in risky behavior, knowing that someone else will pay for their mistakes.
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 467
absorb it, this will create a problem such as overborrowing syndrome16 (McKinnon and Pill, 1996). The details of the explanatory variables for all three generations of crisis models are reported in Table 2.
Table 2.
Explanatory Variables of Financial Crises
This table presents details of studies on the explanatory variables of financial crises, identified by different crisis generation models and supporters of crisis generation models.
Supporters |
Explanatory variables |
|
Krugman (1979) |
Fixed exchange rate |
|
|
Blanco and Garber (1986) |
Fiscal deficit |
|
Roubini and Watchtel (1998) |
Inflation |
|
|
Trade deficit |
|
|
Declining foreign reserves |
|
|
Growth rate of money |
|
|
Credit to reserve ratio |
Obstfeld (1986) |
Including the explanatory |
|
|
|
variables of the |
|
|
model, |
|
Obstfeld (1996) |
Govt. guarantees for arbitrage |
|
|
expectation shift |
|
Flood et al. (1996) |
Interest rate pegging |
|
Chang and Velaso (2000) |
|
McKinnon and Pill (1996) |
Including explanatory variables |
|
|
|
of the above two models, |
|
Radelet and Sachs (1998) |
Capital account liberalization |
|
|
Growth in M2 multiplier |
|
|
Growth in credit/GDP |
|
|
Ratio of domestic bank loan to |
|
|
GDP |
|
|
Liabilities/GDP ratio |
|
|
Fall in bank deposits/GDP ratio |
|
|
Contagion dummy |
|
|
In the presence of a variety of explanatory variables in line with the crisis generation models, EWMs are set to provide the predictive indicators of a financial crisis, using various statistical/econometric methodologies.
16The premature opening of a capital account will lead to a sudden increase in capital inflow. The premature opening of a capital account in a weak financial system of low institutional quality can lead to the outflow of foreign capital as well as domestic capital. This situation is called the overborrowing syndrome (McKinnon and Pill, 1996).
468 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
C. Statistical/ Econometric Methodologies
The third stage of EWMs consists of statistical/econometric analyses for a given crisis definition and set of explanatory variables. Three conventional empirical approaches are associated with EWMs: the indicator approach (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) and/or signaling approach (Kaminsky et al., 1998) and the limited dependent variable probit/logit model (Eichengreen et al.,1995; Frankel and Rose, 1996). Other categories of approaches include the use of innovative techniques for the identification and explanation of financial crisis, such as Markov switching models (Cerra and Saxena, 2002; Martinez, 2002; Abiad, 2003), artificial neural networks (ANNs) and genetic algorithms (Nag and Mitra, 1999; Apoteker and Barthelemy, 2000), binary recursive trees (Ghosh and Ghosh, 2003; Frankel and Wei, 2005), and unit root testing (Virtanen et al., 2016).
C1. Indicator and Signal Approaches
The first category of approaches is nonparametric and includes the indicator approach and/or signal approach, introduced by Kaminsky et al. (1998) and augmented by Bruggermann and Linne (1999) and Edison (2003). Given a number of leading indicators of a crisis, these approaches determine the threshold level beyond which an event is classified as a crisis. The approaches face serious difficulties, because it is not possible to determine the significance of the indicators directly, since thresholds are determined in sample. Determination of the optimal threshold level involves striking a balance between failing to predict a crisis that actually occurs (type I error) and predicting a crisis that does not actually occur (type II error). Accordingly, if the threshold is set too low, then the indicators will catch all the crises but will produce many false signals (noise). Conversely, if the threshold is too high, the indicator will never issue a false alarm, but it will miss all the crises. Hence, for each variable, the optimal threshold is selected to optimize the
Although the signaling approach occupies a prominent place in warning about a signal, we still drop it because of a few shortcomings. First, when each variable is evaluated separately, it neglects interrelated sets of conditions. Second, it ignores potential correlations between different indicators. Third, this approach issues only binary signals, which are either that an indicator is above its threshold, denoting a signal, or below its threshold, denoting no signal of a potential crisis. Consequently, there is no measure of the strength of the signal that is potentially related to the extent to which it exceeds its threshold.
17
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 469
Table 3.
The table reports the
[B (B+D)] / [A (A+C)]
It is the ratio of false signals to all possible bad signals divided by the ratio of good signals to all possible good signals. The extreme noisy indicator would have few entries in cells named A and D, and more in cells named B and C.
Description |
A crisis occurs in the |
No crisis occurs in the |
|
following 24 months |
following 24 months |
||
|
|||
Indicator issues a signal |
A |
B |
|
The indicator does not issue a signal |
C |
D |
C2. Logit and Probit Model
The second category of approaches, that is, linear regression or limited dependent variable estimation methods such as probit and logit techniques, are the most popular category in the literature. Eichengreen et al. (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), and Sach et al. (1996) are among the first studies to have used these techniques to test the statistical significance of various indicators in determining the probability of a future financial crisis. Eichengreen et al. (1996) adopts a probit model to predict currency crises and finds that speculative attacks on a fixed exchange rate play a significant role in predicting the incidence of a currency crisis. Further, Demirguc- Kunt and Detragiache (1998) analyze factors associated with the emergence of systemic banking crises and find banking distress to be associated with low economic growth, high inflation, and high interest rates. Similarly, Joyce (2011), Frost and Tilburg (2014), Hamdi and Jlassi (2014), and Kulkarni and Kamaiah (2015) have used this method extensively to predict financial crises. Additionally, Berg and Pattillo (1999b) highlight the advantages of probability models to overcome the difficulties of a signal approach. First, they provide a framework for the separately testing of the statistical significance of individual explanatory variables. Second, they consider the correlation between the regressors and combine informative indicators into a single composite indicator of crisis. Third, their model allows for the estimation of the probability of a crisis. Fourth, it allows for the introduction of various functional forms between the binominal dependent variable and explanatory variables.
Although logit/probit models have been extensively used, they are still subject to shortcomings. First, the definition of financial crisis as a dummy variable leads to an ad hoc assumption when constructing the model. Second, this approach is subject to the loss of information. Third,
C3. Markov Switching Approach
The Markov switching approach was pioneered by Jeanne and Masson (2000) and used by Cerra and Saxena (2002) to model contagion in the context of Indonesia
470 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
in 1997. Mariano et al. (2000) and Abiad (2002, 2003) were the first to use this approach in EWMs and introduced it as an alternative approach for predicting a currency crisis.
The Markov switching approach of Abiad (2003) applies
C4. Artificial Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms
The ANN approach is capable of learning through a process of trial and error that can be approximated as a statistical estimation of model parameters. The use of neural network analysis in the context of EWMs is due to Nag and Mitra (1999), who constructed an early warning system for currency crises and compare its performance to the indicator approach using monthly data for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in
The primary advantages associated with ANNs are their flexible specification and ability to capture complex interactions among variables. Nonetheless, disadvantages of the ANN approach include greater danger of overfitting, compared to other methodologies, the lack of coefficient estimation, and complicated interactions between the variables. Finally, it is difficult to identify potential indicators that are abnormal or the drivers of forecasting probabilities.
C5. Binary Recursive Trees and Unit Root Tests
Ghosh and Ghosh (2003) use a binary recursive tree to examine the role of structural factors, corporate financing structure, and macroeconomic variables in
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 471
causing a currency crisis for 40 industrialized and emerging countries from 1987 to 1999. The authors find that structural vulnerabilities played an important role in leading to a deep currency crisis and there were complex interactions between these structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances. Although a binary recursive tree allows for interactions between the various explanatory variables, accounting for structural factors that do not change much, it will be difficult for it to generate a warning and it will thus have limited application in the real world. A binary recursive tree is similar to an ANN, in that it requires computational programming to identify the interlinkages between the structural vulnerability and macroeconomic variables.
In a different approach, Virtanen et al. (2016) use unit
In the presence of a variety of statistical/econometric methodologies of EWMs, it is difficult for academicians and policymakers to choose a suitable method for the empirical exercise. However, the choice of empirical method in handling EWMs depends only upon the researcher’s perspective. The details of the statistical and empirical methodologies of EWMs are presented in Table 4.
Table 4.
Statistical/Econometric Methodologies of EWM
The table reports the various empirical methodologies used for the third stage of the early warning models. The table covers the details about model types, authors, methodology, and limitations of the various methodologies used for the construction of early warning models. The * denotes the founder of the empirical methodologies.
Type |
Authors |
Methodology |
Limitations |
Indicator and Signal Approach
Logit and Probit Model
Threshold level of an |
- |
Neglect |
||
Reinhart (1998)* |
indicator. |
|
interrelations. |
|
Bruggermann and |
|
- It’s a warning, no |
||
Linne (1999) |
|
|
signal about crisis |
|
Edison (2003) |
|
|
appearance. |
|
|
|
|
||
Eichengreen et al. |
Dummy for financial |
|
|
|
(1995)* |
crisis. |
- |
||
Frankel and Rose (1996) |
Statistical testing and |
|||
- |
Loss of information |
|||
Sach et al. (1996) |
statistical significance of |
|||
individual variables. |
- |
Single step |
||
Eichengreen et al. (1996) |
||||
Estimation of |
|
estimation |
||
probability of occurring |
|
|
||
Detragiache (1998) |
a financial crisis. |
|
|
472 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table 4. |
|
|
|
Statistical/Econometric Methodologies of EWM (Continued) |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
Type |
Authors |
Methodology |
Limitations |
|
Approach
Mariano et al. (2000)* |
Allows for |
- |
Difficulty in model |
|
Abiad (2002) |
probabilities. |
|
creation. |
|
- |
Highly computation |
|||
Cerra and Saxena (2002) |
||||
Abiad (2003) |
Endogenous |
|
and need strong |
|
|
programing |
|||
determination of crisis |
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
language. |
||
|
period. |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
Inclusion of latent |
- Not a part of |
|
|
|
|
econometric |
|
|
|
variable. |
|
|
|
|
|
packages. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- |
Fails to cooperate |
|
|
|
|
more explanatory |
|
|
|
|
variable. |
Artificial Neural Network |
Nag and Mitra (1999)* |
Neural network |
- |
Danger of |
(ANN) and Genetic |
Apoteker and |
predictability. |
|
overfitting. |
Algorithms |
Barthelemy (2000) |
Genetic algorithms. |
- |
No coefficient |
|
Frank and Schmied |
|
|
estimation. |
|
(2004) |
|
- |
Difficulty in |
|
|
|
|
identifying |
|
|
|
|
indicators. |
|
|
|
- |
Complicated |
|
|
|
|
interaction. |
Binary Recursive Tree |
Ghosh and Ghosh |
- |
Difficulty in |
|
|
(2003)* |
classification technique. |
|
generating |
|
|
|
|
warnings. |
Virtanen et al. (2016)* |
Convert multiple time |
- |
Exposed to |
|
|
|
series into composite |
|
deterministic choice. |
|
|
indicators. |
- |
Specification |
|
|
Window lags |
|
uncertainty. |
EWMs evolved over time, given various definitions, explanatory variables, and statistical/econometric methodologies. Starting with the definition of empirical methodologies, EWMs needed to be augmented. The failure of the
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 473
III.SEEDS FOR THE BIRTH OF A NEW AGENDA
A1. Motivation from the Failure of Identification
EWMs to analyze and predict leading indicators or the accurate timing of the occurrence of a crises are essential for policy formulation. The failure of EWMs to identify the GFC (Davis and Karim, 2008; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010, 2012; Christofides et al., 2016) has raised questions about their efficiency within their operational framework. However, the solution is not to abandon the existing
EWMs, but, rather, to eradicate the weaknesses associated with them, enhancing their efficiency. Further, the accuracy of early models cannot be underestimated, since they accurately predicted the occurrence of a financial crisis in the case of the Chilean crisis in 1982, Brazil in 1994, the Korean crisis in
Argentinean crisis in 2001, and the Turkish case in 2001.
Stagewise specifications in the EWMs should be carried out with caution, since the stage’s accuracy will determine the final accuracy. Given the dynamic nature of financial crises, it is harder to define a financial crisis and identify the explanatory variables in comparison to choosing a method of statistical/econometric analysis to associate with the models. A more accurate specification of the operating framework of EWMs in the first two stages will lead to accuracy depending on the choice of statistical/econometric methodologies. The failure of EWMs to at least notice the GFC (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2012) clearly indicates their failure at every stage of the operating framework. Finally, to augment the existing EWMs, we need to augment all the stages according to the dynamic nature of the financial crisis.
A2. Dynamic Nature of Crisis Models
The evolution from past crises, indicating changes in the leading factors causing the financial crisis over various periods (Eichengreen, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). Thus, the formation of policy to control financial crises based on the leading indicators of an earlier form of financial crisis might not result in efficient policy actions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Further, the efficiency of policy tools in controlling financial crises depends entirely on how accurately the financial crisis is defined and the nature of the occurrence identified.
The next question that arises is whether the current measurement of the financial crisis is efficient in its identification procedure or whether any augmentation is needed to enhance the performance of such measurements. The financial crisis in the late 1970s in the Latin American countries emphasizes the role of weak macroeconomic fundamentals, whereas the case of European countries in the 1980s emphasizes multiple equilibria and the
474 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
fundamentals. Finally, the shock originated in the United States but transmitted across its borders.
The changing nature of financial crises must be considered to accurately identify upcoming financial crises. In this regard, the crisis generation models should be dynamic to capture the dynamic nature of crises. Additionally, there is no need to justify why crisis generation models should evolve over time.
A3. The Subprime Lending Crisis: A Burning Example of this Time Being Different
In the context of the subprime lending/mortgage crisis in
This
18The
19Irrational exuberance describes the situation in which investors’ enthusiasm becomes the reason for raising asset prices that are not supported by fundamentals. See Shiller (2005) for more details.
20A shadow banking system is the term used for the system of a group of
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 475
Allen and Moessner (2011) argue that the GFC was transmitted to various countries through three channels: the shadow banking system, collateral squeeze21, and carry trade unwinding.22 The GFC differs from the global recession of 1929– 1931 because the liquidity commitment of commercial banks was a serious problem during the GFC, whereas the global recession in 1929 witnessed a restriction in channeling the liquidity created by the gold standard period. The GFC was a fiery example of this time being different, weakening the crisis generation models’ identification of the leading factors for the financial crisis. The GFC was a repetition of this syndrome (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) and proof of why an early warning system should be dynamic (Candelon et al., 2014). This situation not demonstrates the dynamic occurrence of a financial event, but also highlights the need for a new generation of models that can capture the dynamic nature of financial crises (Goldstein and Razin, 2013).
IV. RESEARCH AGENDA AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We now suggest a future research agenda, on the following grounds.
A1. The Need for a Hybrid Measure of Financial Crisis
The various typologies of financial crisis have themselves created a puzzle in the way to define what a financial crisis is all about. A currency crisis is defined as a depreciation of currency of 25% or a depreciation of 15% with 10% inflation, whereas a banking crisis is identified by bank runs and liquidity crash. A sovereign debt crisis is all about the repayment of debt and defaults, whereas sudden stops involve the halt of capital flows, specifically in relation to emerging countries that finance their current account deficit using foreign capital. Differently, a balance of payment crisis is likely to occur in conjunction with a currency crisis and not considered to be a single type of financial crisis. The joint occurrence of a currency crisis and a banking crisis, that is, a twin crisis, will make a country’s economic situation worse than in a
The accuracy of measuring financial crisis is a challenging task in the presence of various financial crisis typologies. The choice of financial crisis measurement is not difficult in the case of a single financial crisis event (Claessens and Kose, 2013). Conversely, the joint occurrence of financial crises, as in twin and triple crises, is difficult to measure when constructing EWMs, since the mixture of
21A collateral squeeze is a process aimed at reducing counterparty risk where, if the borrower defaults, the collateral will be seized and paid to the creditor. It is part of the regulation of financial systems, where the loans must meet criteria for eligibility, that is, the level of collateral is decided based on property valuation.
22For example, since US and European interest rates are low, Japanese investors started to sell their dollar and euro investments and return their money to Japan. Yen carry trade becomes unprofitable, and investors can lose substantial amounts if the yen rises against the dollar or euro. Consequently, with a rising yen, people sell their foreign investments and end their carry trades. This increases demand for the yen even more, causing a further rise in the yen. This is the scenario of carry trade unwinding.
476 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
quantitative and qualitative measurements of financial crisis might not be accurate and can lead to the model’s failure (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In this context, with the presence of quantitative and qualitative measures of financial crisis, the construction of hybrid measures based on a certain weighting will be more productive in forecasting the future occurrence of twin or triple crises or the probability of leading to another form of financial crisis.
A2. Identifying Potential Explanatory Variables for the Financial Crisis: The Need for a
The failure to identify the leading factors of crisis emphasizes the need for a
A3. Contagion/interconnectedness as an Explanatory Variable
The word contagion generally denotes the spread of market disturbances from one country to another and is a process observed through comovements in exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and capital flows, and so forth. The GFC has amplified the importance of contagion, originating from the collapse of Lehman Brothers and spreading to most countries (Imbs, 2010). In line with the failure of EWMs to foresee the financial crisis of
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 477
2012) emphasize the increasing role of global factors and interconnectedness among markets as leading risk factors in today’s integrated world.
Examples of the channel of transmission of shocks include the role of insurance (Allen and Gale, 1998), the
The role of contagion in transmitting financial crises while increasing trade and financial integration has been identified in the literature in various ways. Eichengreen et al. (1996) find that the contagion effect remains significant, whereas Fratzscher (1998) supports the contagious nature of the currency crisis with a comparison of the Latin American crisis with the East Asian crisis. Similarly, Cerra and Saxena (2002) and Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) confirm the significant role of contagion in transmitting shocks. Similarly, Hermansen and Rohn (2015) emphasize the role of global risk indicators outperforming domestic indicators in terms of highlighting the role of international development. Finally, the spread of the crisis to other countries indicates that financial integration plays an important role in transmitting financial crises, since one country’s vulnerable financial market can have an impact on other countries through their interlinkages in either macroeconomic transmission or the shock transmission channel (Bordo and Helbling, 2003). Additionally, Minoiu et al. (2015) examine the connectedness of financial linkages in predicting banking crises. Connectedness plays an important role in the transmission of crisis, because the failure of one economic agent leads to direct failure (insolvency) and indirect failure
Table 5 provides the five definitions and measurements highlighted by Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). The EWMs’ inclusion of these quantitative contagion indicators could enhance their efficiency.
23An information cascade is a situation in which a person makes a decision/choice based on the observations or choices of others, without knowing the reality and circulates the information, assuming it is true.
478 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
Table 5.
Definition and Measurements of Contagion
The table covers the five definitions and measurements of contagion as highlighted by Pericoli and Sbracia (2003).
No. |
Definition |
Measurement |
1 |
When a significant increase in the probability |
Exchange rate pressure index |
|
of a crisis in one country, conditional on a crisis |
|
|
occurring in another country. |
|
2 |
When the volatility of asset prices spillover from |
Multivariate GARCH model |
|
the crisis country to other countries. |
|
3 |
When |
Jumps in multiple equilibria |
|
cannot be explained by fundamentals. |
|
4 |
When a significant increase in |
|
|
prices and quantities across markets, conditional |
|
|
on a crisis occurring in one market or group |
|
|
markets. |
|
5 |
When the transmission channel intensifies or, |
Data generating process |
|
more generally, changes after a shock in one |
|
|
market. |
|
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new agenda for augmenting existing EWMs that could capture the dynamic nature of financial crises. We propose an agenda based on three aspects: measurement of a hybrid index of the financial crisis, the need for a
This paper’s proposed agenda for the construction of EWMs certainly does not constitute final steps toward a comprehensive EWM of financial crises. Rather, it suggests the construction of an EWM by eradicating the various lacunae associated with the existing models that can outline the difficulties. By suggesting a new agenda for the construction of EWMs to resolve these difficulties, this paper proposes various steps toward augmenting the existing EWMs, which could become more powerful tools in predicting financial crises. Future research could focus on the construction and empirical examination of this new agenda.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The earlier versions of the paper were presented at 1st PAN IIT Management conference, IIT Roorkee, India, 2018 and 13th Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking Conference, Bali, Indonesia, 2019.
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 479
REFERENCES
Abiad, A. (2002). Early Warning Systems for Currency Crises: A Markov Switching Approach with Applications to Southeast Asia. PhD Dissertation, Dept. Of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Abiad, A. (2003).
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1998). Optimal Financial Crises. Journal of Finance, 53,1245- 1284.
Allen, W. A., & Moessner, R. (2011). The International Propagation of the Financial Crisis of 2008 and a Comparison with 1931. BIS Working Papers No. 348.
Anwar, S., & Ali, A. H. (2018).
Apoteker, T., & Barthelemy, S. (2000). Genetic Algorithms and Financial Crises in Emerging Markets. In AFFI International Conference in Finance Processing.
Babecky, J., Havranek, T., Mateju, J., Tusnak, M., Smidkova, K., & Vasicek, B. (2011). Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: Evidence from a Panel of 40 Developed Countries. Czech National Bank Working Paper Series No. 8.
Babecky, J., Havranek, T., Matyu, J., Tusnak, M., Smidkova, K., & Vasicek, B. (2012). Banking, Debt and Currency Cries: Early Warning Indicators for Developed Countries. European Central Bank Working Paper Series NO. 1485, October.
Berg, A., & Patillo, C. (1999a). Are Currency Crises Predictable? A Test. IMF Staff Papers, 46,
Berg, A., & Pattillo, C. (1999b). Predicting Currency Crises: The Indicators Approach and an Alternative. Journal of International Money and Finance, 18,
Berg, A., Borensztein, E., & Pattillo, C. (2004). Assessing Early Warning Systems: Why Have They Worked in Practice. IMF Working Paper No.52.
Berg, A., Borensztein, E., & Pattillo, C. (2005). Assessing Early Warning Systems: Why Have They Worked in Practice. IMF Economic Review, 52,
Blanchard, O., & Kremer, M. (1997). Disorganization. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112,
Blanco, H., & Garber, P. (1986). Recurrent Devaluation and Speculative Attacks on the Mexican Peso. Journal of Political Economy,
Bordo, M. D., & Helbling, T. F. (2003). Have National Business Cycles Become more Synchronized?. NBER Working Paper No. 10130.
Bordo, M.D., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel D., &
Bruggermann, A., & Linne, T. (1999). Are the Central and Eastern European Transition Countries Still Vulnerable to a Financial Crisis? Results from the Signal Approach. Bank of Finland Discussion Paper.
Bucevska, V., (2011). An Analysis of Financial Crisis by an Early Warning System Model: The Case of the EU Candidate Countries. Business Economic Horizon, 4,
Bussiere, M., & Fratzscher, M. (2006). Towards a New Early Warning System of Financial Crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 25,
Bussiere, M., & Mulder, C. (2000). Political Instability and Economic Vulnerability. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 5,
480 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
Calvo, G. (1998). Capital Flows and
Calvo, G., & Reinhart, C. (2000). When Capital Inflows Suddenly Stop: Consequences and Policy Options. Reforming the International Monetary and Financial System IMG, Washington, DC,
Candelon, B., Dumitrescu, E., & Hurlin, C. (2012). How to Evaluate an Early- Warning System: Toward a Unified Statistical Framework for Assessing Financial Crises Forecasting Methods?. IMF Economic Review, 60,
Candelon, B., Dumitrescu, E., & Hurlin, C. (2014). Currency Crisis Early Warning Systems: Why They Should Be Dynamic. International Journal of Forecasting, 30,
Cecchetti, S. G., Kohler, M., & Upper, C. (2009). Financial Crises and Economic Activity. National Bureau of Economic Research No. 15379.
Cerra, V., & Saxena, S. C. (2002). Contagion, Monsoons, and Domestic Turmoil in Indonesia’s Currency Crisis. Review of International Economics, 10,
Cheng, R., & Velasco, A. (2000). Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy. NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 14, MIT Press.
Christofides, C., Eicher, T. S., & Papageorgiou, C. (2016). Did Established Early Warning Signals Predict the 2008 Crises?. European Economic Review, 81, 103- 114.
Claessens, S., & Ayhan, K. (2013). Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implementations. IMF Working Paper No. 28.
Claessens, S., Kose, M. A., & Terrones, M. E. (2012). How Do Business and Financial Cycle Interact?. Journal of International Economics, 87,
Connor, G., Thomas, F., & Brian, O. (2010). The US and Irish Crises: Their Distinctive Differences and Common Features. Irish economy, Note No. 10.
Davis, E. P., & Karim, D. (2008). Could Early Warning System Have Helped to Predict the
Davis, J. S. (2014). Financial Integration and International Business Cycle
Dawood, M., Horsewood, N., & Strobel, F. (2017). Predicting Sovereign Debt Crisis: An Early Warning System approach. Journal of Financial Stability, 28,
Demirguc, K. A., & Detragiache, E.(1998). The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries. IMF Working Paper No. 106.
Diamond, D., & Dybvig, P. (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy, 91,
Edison, H. J. (2003). Do Indicators of Financial Crises Work? An Evaluation of an Early Warning System. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 8,
Eichengreen, B. (2003). Three Generations of Crises, Three Generations of Crisis Models. Journal of International Money and Finance, 22,
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., & Wyplosz, C. (1995). Exchange Market Mayhem: The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks. Economic Policy, 10, 249– 312.
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., & Wyplosz, C. (1996). Contagious Currency Crises: First Tests. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98,
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 481
Flood, R., & Garber, P. (1984). Gold Monetization and Gold Discipline. Journal of Political Economy, 92,
Flood, R., Garber, P., & Kramer, C. (1996). Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Another Linear Example. Journal of International Economics, 41,
Franck, R., & Schmied, A. (2004). Predicting Currency Crisis Contagion from East Asia to Russia and Brazil: an Artificial Neural Network Approach.
Frankel, J., & Wei, S. (2005). Managing Macroeconomic Crises. Managing Economic Volatility and Crises: A Practitioner’s Guide, (Eds.) Joshua Aizenman and Brian Pinto. Cambridge University Press.
Frankel, J.A., & Rose, A.K. (1996). Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical Treatment. Journal of International Economics, 41,
Fratzscher, M. (1998). Why Are Currency Crises Contagious? A Comparison of the Latin American Crisis of
Frost, J., & Tilburg, R. V. (2014). Financial Globalization or Great Financial Expansion? The Impact of Capital Flows in Credit and Banking Crises. DNB Working Paper No. 441, September.
Ghosh, S. R., & Ghosh, A. R. (2003). Structural Vulnerabilities and Currency Crises. IMF Staff Papers, 50,
Goldstein, I. & Razin, A. (2013). Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises. NBER Working Paper No. 18670.
Goldstein, M. (1998). The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures and Systematic Implication. Institute for International Economics. Washington DC.
Goldstein, M., Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (2000). Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning Systems for Emerging Markets. Institute for International Economics. Washington DC.
Gupta, P., Mishra, D., & Sahay, R. (2003). Output Response to Currency Crises. IMF Working Paper No. 230.
Hamdi, H., & Jlassi, N. B. (2014). Financial Liberalization, Disaggregated Capital Flows and Banking Crisis: Evidence from Developing Countries. Economic Modelling, 41,
Hermansen, M., & Rohn, O. (2015). Economic Resilience: The Usefulness of Early Warning Indicators in OECD Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1250.
Hutchison, M.M., & Noy, I. (2006). Sudden Stops and the Mexican Wave: Currency Crises, Capital Flow Reversals and Output Loss in Emerging Markets. Journal of Development Economics, 79,
Imbs, J. (2010). The First Global Recession in Decades. IMF Economic Review, 58(2),
International Monetary Fund (2002). Early Warning System Models: The Next Steps Forward. Global Financial Stability Report Chapter 4, October.
International Monetary Fund (2010). The
Jeanne, O., & Masson, P. (2000). Currency Crises, Sunspots and
Joyce, J. P. (2011). Financial Globalization and Banking Crises in Emerging Markets. Open Economic Review, 22,
482 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (1999). The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and
Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (2000). On Crises, Contagion, and Confusion. Journal of International Economics, 51,
Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (2002). Financial Markets in Time of Stress. Journal of Development Economics, 69,
Kaminsky, G. L., Reinhart, C. M., & Vegh, C. A. (2003). The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17,
Kaminsky, G.L., Lizondo, S., & Reinhart, C. (1998). Leading Indicators of Currency Crisis. IMF Staff Paper, 45,
Kindleberger, C. (1978). Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of financial crises. MIT Press, Boston.
Kletzer, K. M., & Wright, B. D. (2000). Sovereign Debt As Intertemporal Barter. The American Economic Review, 90,
Krugman, P. (1979). A Model of
Krugman, P. (1999). Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises. International Tax and Public finance, 6,
Kulkarni, A., & Kamaiah, B. (2015). Predicting Balance of Payments Crises for Some Emerging Countries. Theoretical and Applied Economics, 22,
Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2012). Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database. IMF Working Paper No. 163.
Manasse, P., & Roubini, N. (2009). “Rules of Thumb” for Sovereign Debt Crises. Journal of International Economics, 78,
Mariano, R. S., Gultekin, B. N., Ozmucer, S., & Shabbir, T. (2000). Models of Economic and Financial Crises. Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies, 2.
Martinez, P. M. S., (2002). A
McKinnon, R., & Hill, P. (1996). Credible Liberalizations and International Capital Flows: The Over Borrowing Syndrome. Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia, University of Chicago Press,
Mendoza, E. G., & Quadrini, V. (2010). Financial Globalization, Financial Crises and Contagion. Journal of Monetary Economics, 57,
Minoiu, C., Kang, C., Subramanian, V.S., & Berea, A. (2015). Does Financial Connectedness Predict Crises?. Quantitative Finance, 15,
Nag, A., & Mitra, A. (1999). Neural Networks and Early Warning Indicators of Currency Crisis. Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, 20,
Obstfeld, M. (1986). Rational and
Obstfeld, M. (1996). Models of Currency Crises with
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions 483
Peltonen, T. A., Rancan, M., & Sarlin, P. (2015). Interconnectedness of the Banking Sector as a Vulnerability to Crises. European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 1866, November.
Pericoli, M., & Sbracia, M. (2003). A Primer on Financial Contagion. Journal of Economic Surveys, 17,
Pritsker, M. (2013). Definitions and Types of Financial Contagion. In Evidence and Impact of Financial Globalization (Eds).
Radelet, S., & Sachs, J. (1998). The onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis. NBER Working Paper No. 6680.
Radelet, S., & Sachs, J. (2000). The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis. Chapter in Currency Crises, University of Chicago Press,
Rajan, R. G. (2005). Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?. NBER Working Paper No. 11728.
Rajan, R. G. (2010). Fault Lines. Princeton University Press.
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009a). This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton University Press.
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009b). The Aftermath of Financial Crises. American Economic Review, 99,
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2008). Is the 2007 US
Rose, A. K., & Spiegel, M. M. (2009). Predicting Crises,
Rose, A. K., & Spiegel, M. M. (2010).
Rose, A. K., & Spiegel, M. M. (2012).
Roubini, N., & Wachtel, P. (1998). Current Account Sustainability in Transition Economies. NBER Working Paper No.6468.
Sachs, J., Tornell, A., & Velasco, A. (1996). Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Salant, S. W., & Henderson, D. W. (1978). Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold. Journal of Political Economy, 86,
Shiller, R. J. (2005). Irrational Exurbence. 2nd Edition, Princeton University Press. Simorangkir, I. (2006). Determinants of Bank Runs in Banking Crisis 1997/98:
An Study by Using Dynamic Panel Data. Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, 9,
Simorangkir, I. (2011). Determinant Of Bank Runs In Indonesia: Bad Luck Or Fundamental?. Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, 14,
Summers, L. H. (2000). International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures. The American Economic Review, 90,
Virtanen, T., Tolo, E., Viren, M., & Taipalus. K. (2016). Use of Unit Root Methods in Early Warning of Financial Crises. Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 27.
484 |
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 4, 2019 |
|
|
This page is intentionally left blank