Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2019), pp. 29 - 46
VENTURE CAPITAL AND CORPORATE INNOVATION INPUT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SYNDICATED INVESTMENT
Ning Jiang1, Yuan Yang1*, Bingkun Yang1, Wenli Huang2
1China Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,
Hangzhou, China.
2China Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, China. Email: wlhuangmath@126.com
*Corresponding Author. Email: yangyuan024@163.com
ABSTRACT
Using data for 341 enterprises listed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and taking R&D expenditure as an indicator of innovation investment, this paper implements multiple linear regression to test whether venture capital promotes corporate innovation input. It also considers the relationship between the syndicated investment of venture capital and innovation input. The results show that venture capital indeed promotes R&D in the invested enterprises. The innovation input of syndicated investment enterprises is significantly higher than that of sole investment enterprises. Under syndicated investment, the higher the number of syndicated investment members and the greater the heterogeneity of the shareholding ratio among the members, the higher is the innovation input. The reputation of the syndicated investment team, however, has no significant impact on innovation input.
Keywords: Venture capital; Syndicated investment; Innovation input.
JEL Classification: G24.
Article history: |
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Received |
: January 4, 2019 |
Revised |
: March 23, 2019 |
Accepted |
: April 6, 2019 |
Available online |
: April 30, 2019 |
https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v22i1.1036
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I. INTRODUCTION
Enterprises are the main players in market economies. Their technological innovation capabilities are closely related to their performance and growth. More specifically, factors such as enterprise financing methods, governance structure, and level of financial market development and related policies will have differing impacts on enterprise innovation activity. Capital is a decisive input factor, since financing constraints inhibit innovation activities of enterprises. Generally, the innovation input of enterprises stems from internal and external financing. The former refers mainly to enterprises using their own capital investment, while the latter mainly pertains to banking system (in debt financing markets) and Venture Capital (VC) (in equity financing markets) (Fei, 2010). In choosing target borrowers, banks focus mainly on company size, collateral and income level, but VC is not sensitive to these factors. Therefore, in Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) financing, VC has several advantages over bank financing (Liang, 2015).
VC can not only provide sufficient funding for enterprises, it also may actively participate in the management of invested companies. VC provides a range of
VC firms face high investment risk, so they often adopt a syndicated investment strategy; that is, several VC firms jointly invest in a target enterprise. Syndicated investment is vital in the VC market. Compared with individual investment, it can not only diversify risk, but also integrate the advantages of each investor to generate a
There is little literature on the relationship between VC and enterprise innovation in China, and research on how the characteristics of VC firms influence enterprise innovation are even rarer. The relationship between VC and enterprise
3See “Implementation Opinions of the People’s Government of Jiangxi Province on Promoting a Number of Policy Measures for Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation.”
4See “Implementation Opinions of the People’s Government of Zhejiang Province on Promoting Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation.”
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment |
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innovation requires additional empirical evidence. To enrich the existing research on VC and enterprise innovation in China, this paper takes the companies listed on the GEM market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a sample to explore the impact of VC on corporate innovation input and the role of the syndicated investment strategy of VC firms. It also examines the impact of the characteristics of VC on innovation input under syndicated investment.
This work is significant for several reasons. It is based on VC, a vital component of the equity financing market,5 and it verifies and supplements prior research on VC and enterprise innovation. Existing research on the relationship between VC investment form and strategy and corporate innovation investment is not sufficient. Therefore, this paper uses a VC syndicated investment sample to supplement the literature. Further, this paper explores the varying impacts of various characteristics of syndicated investment teams on enterprise innovation input, to determine what form of syndicated investment can better enhance the incubation of innovation. The purpose of this paper is to help improve the efficiency of incubation of innovation by providing a reference framework for VC firms to choose syndicated investment partners. In addition, it will help innovative enterprises choose suitable VC firms.
II.LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
A. VC and Enterprise Innovation
It is generally believed that VC is a major factor behind the high level of technological innovation in American companies (Keuschnigg, 2004). According to Kortum and Lerner (2000),
Zheng and Li (2001) believe that VC plays an irreplaceable role in helping small- and
5According to Zhang and Liao (2011) and Chen et al. (2017), this paper does not distinguish between
VC and PE, and collectively refers to both as VC.
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of enterprise innovation. At the same time, participation of VC reduces the degree of information asymmetry between investors and enterprises. Wu (2009) believes that the integration of capital and technology brought about by VC capital support and its participation in enterprise management promotes enterprise innovation. Fu et al. (2012) find that compared with other institutional investors, VC can better promote innovation investment in GEM companies. Chen et al. (2017) and Wang and Hu (2017) also find that VC plays a significant role in improving innovation performance.
VC firms are professional investors that usually specialize in particular investment fields. They accumulate industry resources and gain relevant experience in business management (Chen et al., 2017). VC often participates actively in the operation and governance of the invested company by joining the board. They use professional management experience to improve corporate governance structure and provide support in areas such as strategy making, human resources, and financing. These
Hypothesis 1: VC participation has a positive impact on corporate innovation.
B. Syndicated Investment and Corporate Innovation Input
As a common investment strategy for VC, syndicated investment has more advantages than individual investment. For example, syndicated investment enables resource sharing and provides invested enterprises with rich resources and
Hypothesis 2: Compared with sole investment enterprises, innovation input in syndicated investment enterprises is higher.
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment |
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C. Characteristics of Syndicated Investment and Enterprise Innovation Input
The syndicated investment model is favored by VC firms in several countries. But how will syndicated investment with different characteristics affect enterprise innovation input? The present paper discusses the relationship between enterprise innovation input and syndicated investment characteristics, such as number of investment members, reputation characteristics, and proportion of shareholding.
First, more risk organizations involved in syndicated investment means more financial support, professional guidance, and other resources. Further, they also bring a higher level of risk diversification. Lu et al. (2017) show that the innovation ability of the invested company grows with the number of syndicated investment institutions. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: The innovation input of the invested company is positively correlated with the number of institutions that invest in a syndicated investment.
Reputable VC firms often have rich investment experience and a well- established network of relationships. They play a positive role in discovering and nurturing
Hypothesis 4: Firm innovation input is positively correlated with the reputation of the syndicated investment team.
Finally, differences in shareholding ratio among members of the syndicated investment will influence investment results. Generally, syndicated investment can diversify investment risk. If there are large differences in members’ investment amounts, however, the effect of risk diversification will be nullified. When a particular member holds a relatively large proportion of shares, moral hazard tends to occur and other members are prone to
Hypothesis 5: The heterogeneity of syndicated investment members’ shareholding ratio is an unfavorable factor in enterprise innovation input.
III.RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Sample and Data
We select firms listed on the GEM market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the period January 1, 2012 to July 14, 2017 as our initial sample; we use annual data. On the one hand, the GEM was originally created to provide an ideal exit
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channel for domestic VC, and it brings together many
Our data comprise three parts: (1) VC data: a sample of
After excluding companies with missing data and financial enterprises, the final sample includes 341 companies, of which 227 (66.57%) have a VC background at the time of listing. Judging from yearly data,
B. Variable Definitions
B1. Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is listed company R&D expenditure. As an indicator that every listed company must reveal, R&D expenditure is highly available and representative. It measures company investment in innovation activities and can reflect company attitude toward them, showing the most timely and direct performance of company efforts in innovation. Therefore, based on existing research, this paper takes the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure to measure company innovation input (Zhan et al., 2015).
B2. Independent Variables
We set two dummy variables, VC (VC) and syndicated investment (Syn). Drawing on Wu et al. (2012), we judge whether the shareholders of the company are VC firms by consulting databases, the investment community, the website
SynNum refers to the number of VC firms among the
6See https://www.cvsource.com.cn/
7See https://www.wind.com.cn/
8See http://www.51ifind.com/
9 See http://us.gtadata.com/
10 See https://www.tianyancha.com/
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment |
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company. When the age of the leading institution is equal to or greater than 6 years, SynRep=1, otherwise SynRep=0.
Both Gomper (1996) and Hsu (2004) believe that an institution’s age is, to some extent, a suitable indicator of a ’s experience and reputation. Gomper (1996) separates
In portraying the heterogeneity of VC shareholding ratio, this paper draws on Beckman and Haunschild (2002) and Lu et al. (2017) to construct a coefficient of variation for measuring the heterogeneity of the continuous variables, that is, the ratio of standard deviation to mean of the shareholding ratio. The larger the ratio, the greater the heterogeneity of the shareholding ratio between different syndicated investment members. The heterogeneity indicator is built as follows:
(1)
where Sharei is the shareholding ratio of VC firms i.
B3. Control Variables
Based on the literature, this paper takes company size, profitability, solvency, and policy factors as control variables (Chemmanur et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2017). Company size (Lnasset) is the natural logarithm of the company’s total assets at the end of a year; profitability (ROE) is the ratio of company net profit to total equity at the end of a year; solvency (Lev) is the ratio of company total liabilities to total assets at the end of a year; policy factor (Lngov) is the natural logarithm of government subsidies received by the company.
Table 1.
Variable Definition
In this table, all variables appearing in this paper are defined and explained. |
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Variable |
Definition |
Variable Name |
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Dependent |
Innovation Input |
the natural logarithm of |
LnR&D |
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Variable |
company R&D expenditure |
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Venture Capital |
dummy variable, VC=1 if it is a VC- |
VC |
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backed company, otherwise VC=0 |
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Independent |
Syndicated |
dummy variable, Syn=1 if it is a |
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syndicated investment, otherwise |
Syn |
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Variables |
Investment |
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Syn=0 |
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Number of VC |
number of VC firms among the top- |
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ten shareholders in the syndicated |
SynNum |
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firms |
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investment sample |
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36Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 1, 2019
Table 1.
Variable Definition (contd.)
In this table, all variables appearing in this paper are defined and explained. |
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Variable |
Definition |
Variable Name |
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leading VC firm’s age, dummy |
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Syndicated |
variable, SynRep=1 if the age of |
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Investment Team |
the leading institution is equal to |
SynRep |
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Independent |
Reputation |
or greater than 6 years, otherwise |
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Variables |
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SynRep=0. |
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Heterogeneity of |
VC Shareholding Ratio |
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VC Shareholding |
Heterogeneity in the year of the |
ShareHetero |
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Ratio |
invested company’s IPO |
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the natural logarithm of the |
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Company Size |
company’s total assets at the end |
Lnasset |
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of a year |
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Profitability |
the ratio of company net profit to |
ROE |
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Control Variables |
total equity at the end of a year |
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Solvency |
the ratio of company total liabilities |
Lev |
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to total assets at the end of a year |
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the natural logarithm of |
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Policy Factor |
government subsidies received by |
Lngov |
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the company |
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dummy variable, Inv_after=1 |
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Other Variables |
VC Participation |
if it is an observation after VC |
Inv_after |
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participation, Inv_after=0 if it is an |
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observation before VC participation
C. Model Design
To analyze the impact of VC participation on the innovation input of the invested company, this paper draws on Chen et al. (2017) and builds a model to examine the difference between enterprises with and without VC participation. At the same time, it also illustrates how the innovation input of
LnR&Dit = α0 + α1VC*Inv_afterit + αjControlit + Yi + λt + εit |
(2) |
Inv_after is a dummy variable that measures whether a VC firm joins in: Inv_after=1 indicates an observation after VC participation, and Inv_after=0 indicates an observation before VC participation. VC*Inv_after is the cross term between VC and Inv_after: value 1 means observation of
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment |
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To verify Hypotheses |
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LnR&Di = α0 + α1Xi + α2Lnasseti + α3Roei + α4Lngovi + α5Levi + εi |
(3) |
where X refers to syndicated investment characteristics: whether the investment is syndicated (Syn), number of syndicated investment members (SynNum), reputation (SynRep), and shareholding ratio (ShareHetero).
D. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.
Summary Statistics on Main Variables
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the
Panel A: the whole sample
Variables |
Number of |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min. |
Max. |
|
Observations |
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LnR&D |
1336 |
16.713 |
0.772 |
11.816 |
20.858 |
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VC*Inv_after |
1336 |
0.495 |
0.500 |
0 |
1 |
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Syn |
208 |
0.697 |
0.461 |
0 |
1 |
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SynNum |
145 |
3.124 |
1.269 |
2 |
7 |
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SynRep |
145 |
0.710 |
0.455 |
0 |
1 |
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ShareHetero |
145 |
1.694 |
0.733 |
0 |
2.999 |
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Lnasset |
1336 |
19.975 |
0.713 |
17.730 |
23.743 |
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ROE |
1336 |
24.820 |
13.146 |
1.475 |
148.838 |
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Lngov |
1336 |
15.225 |
1.355 |
0 |
19.764 |
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Lev |
1336 |
33.992 |
16.655 |
1.103 |
91.070 |
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Panel B: companies with and without VC participation |
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Companies without VC |
Companies with VC |
Whether |
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Participation |
Participation |
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Variables |
Supported |
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(N=447) |
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(N=889) |
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by VC |
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Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
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LnR&D |
16.654 |
0.786 |
16.742 |
0.763 |
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Lnasset |
19.961 |
0.770 |
19.983 |
0.683 |
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ROE |
27.361 |
14.861 |
23.542 |
12.000 |
3.819*** |
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(5.057) |
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Lngov |
15.075 |
1.463 |
15.301 |
1.292 |
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Lev |
33.610 |
17.709 |
34.184 |
16.106 |
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Table 2 shows summary statistics on the main variables. Panel A refers to the entire sample. Note that the proportion of observations of
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. VC and Innovation Input
This part shows the main empirical results of this paper and analyzes the relationship between innovation input and VC/syndicated investment characters.
A1. Endogeneity of VC and Innovation Input
When investing in a venture, VC firms consider factors such as market attractiveness, strategy, technology, products or services, customer usage, competition, trading conditions, and the quality and experience of the management team (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004). The target company may have its own advantages in innovation, in which case our research will face endogeneity. Therefore, to rule out the possibility that the two kinds of companies have different levels of innovation input before VCs make their investment, this paper performs a regression with the data of companies without VC participation and
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment |
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Table 3.
R&D Before the VC Participation
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the
Variables |
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LnR&D |
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(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
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VC |
0.055 |
0.017 |
0.084 |
0.064 |
0.066 |
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(0.67) |
(0.30) |
(1.52) |
(1.22) |
(1.30) |
|
Lnasset |
|
0.745*** |
0.805*** |
0.748*** |
0.827*** |
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(15.48) |
(19.09) |
(17.55) |
(18.48) |
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ROE |
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0.011*** |
0.010*** |
0.010*** |
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(5.99) |
(6.09) |
(6.48) |
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Lngov |
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0.100*** |
0.089*** |
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(4.58) |
(4.23) |
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Lev |
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Constant |
15.078*** |
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(182.33) |
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Obs |
341 |
341 |
341 |
341 |
341 |
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R2 |
0.1690 |
0.5591 |
0.5970 |
0.6224 |
0.6427 |
Table 4.
The Relationship between VC’s Investing Decision Factors and the Invested
Company’s R&D Expenditure
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the
Variables |
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VC |
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(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
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LnR&D |
0.072 |
0.039 |
0.224 |
0.185 |
0.202 |
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(0.70) |
(0.27) |
(1.46) |
(1.16) |
(1.24) |
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Lnasset |
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0.049 |
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(0.32) |
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ROE |
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Lngov |
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0.061 |
0.062 |
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(0.96) |
(0.99) |
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Lev |
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0.002 |
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(0.44) |
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Constant |
1.463 |
1.200 |
1.551 |
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(0.59) |
(0.48) |
(0.59) |
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Obs |
341 |
341 |
341 |
341 |
341 |
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A2. Analysis of Regression Results
Table 5.
Regression Results of VC and R&D Expenditure
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the
Variables |
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LnR&D |
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(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
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VC*Inv_after |
0.032 |
0.085** |
0.075** |
0.074* |
0.068* |
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(1.53) |
(2.63) |
(2.27) |
(2.21) |
(2.04) |
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Lnasset |
|
0.374*** |
0.409*** |
0.408*** |
0.398*** |
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(21.88) |
(23.13) |
(21.54) |
(19.56) |
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ROE |
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|
0.003*** |
0.003*** |
0.003*** |
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(9.04) |
(8.94) |
(6.10) |
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Lngov |
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|
0.002 |
0.003 |
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(0.53) |
(0.65) |
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Lev |
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0.001* |
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(2.16) |
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Constant |
15.706*** |
8.917*** |
8.121*** |
8.115*** |
8.218*** |
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(195.50) |
(26.09) |
(22.99) |
(23.61) |
(23.38) |
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Year |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
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Industry |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
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Obs |
1336 |
1336 |
1336 |
1336 |
1336 |
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R2 |
0.0658 |
0.3370 |
0.3618 |
0.3642 |
0.3454 |
Table 5 shows that VC participation has a significant positive effect on company R&D expenditure, and the positive effect remains stable when considering other variables. This may be interpreted as showing that VC participation can promote R&D expenditure of the invested company. As for the control variables, the firm size variable (Lnasset) is positive at the 1% significance level, and the profitability variable (j) is positive at the 10% significance level. These results are reasonable, because companies with large scale and good profitability may more abundantly fund R&D activities. Based on the analysis above, Hypothesis 1 is accepted, that is, VC firms can promote invested companies’ innovation input.
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment |
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B. Syndicated Investment and Innovation Input
Table 6.
Regression Results of Syndicated Investment and R&D Expenditure
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the
(D)When analyzing the impact of syndicated investment characteristics on company’s innovation input, separate testing of these factors may overestimate their effects on the dependent variable, so we have also tested all these factors in one model (column 4 in
Panel B), and the results are consistent with the results of the separate tests. Due to space constraints, the regression results of the control variables are omitted from Panel B. Details can be obtained from authors.
Panel A: syndicated investment and R&D expenditure
Variables |
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LnR&D |
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(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
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Syn |
0.204** |
0.116 |
0.141* |
0.145** |
0.125* |
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(2.27) |
(1.59) |
(1.95) |
(2.00) |
(1.75) |
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Lnasset |
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|
0.876*** |
0.843*** |
0.832*** |
0.790*** |
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(12.54) |
(11.38) |
(11.12) |
(9.93) |
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ROE |
|
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|
0.015* |
0.014* |
0.014* |
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(1.92) |
(1.85) |
(1.81) |
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Lngov |
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|
0.021 |
0.024 |
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(1.15) |
(1.31) |
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Lev |
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0.004 |
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(1.18) |
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Constant |
14.729*** |
0.004 |
||||||
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(163.89) |
(1.18) |
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Obs |
208 |
208 |
208 |
208 |
208 |
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R2 |
0.1837 |
0.5136 |
0.5257 |
0.5278 |
0.5317 |
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Panel B: syndicated investment characteristics and R&D expenditure |
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Variables |
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LnR&D |
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(1) |
(2) |
|
(3) |
(4) |
||||
|
|
|||||||
SynNum |
0.104** |
|
|
|
0.145*** |
|||
|
(2.15) |
|
|
|
(3.66) |
|||
SynRep |
|
|
|
0.035 |
|
|
0.002 |
|
|
|
|
|
(0.35) |
|
|
(0.20) |
|
ShareHetero |
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
Obs |
145 |
145 |
|
145 |
145 |
|||
R2 |
0.5521 |
0.5264 |
|
0.5817 |
0.6296 |
Table 6 shows regression results of the relationship between syndicated investment and R&D expenditure. First, syndicated investment has a significant positive correlation with invested company R&D expenditure, which indicates that companies supported by VC syndicated investment have higher innovation input than companies supported by only one VC firms. Second, the positive correlation between the number of syndicated investment members and company R&D expenditure means that the greater the number of syndicated investment members,
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the higher the R&D expenditure. Moreover, although the leading VC firms’ age remains positive with the invested company’s R&D expenditure, the results are not significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of syndicated investment members’ shareholding ratio heterogeneity is significantly negative, which means that the smaller the heterogeneity, the more positive the impact of syndicated investment on R&D investment of the companies. In summary, Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 5 are supported by our empirical evidence.11
C. Robustness Test
This part shows the results of robustness test, in which we created a dummy treatment group and a randomly selected experimental group.
C1. Dummy Treatment Group
To test the robustness of the conclusion that VC participation promotes enterprise innovation input, we set a dummy treatment group where VC participation happens one year later than the reality. The regression results are shown in Table 7. It is evident that VC participation has no significant positive impact on R&D expenditure, so the test result of Hypothesis 1 in the preceding section 3 is credible.
Table 7.
Regression Results of VC and R&D Expenditure (Dummy Treatment Group)
Use the following to interpret this table. (A) Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with *, **, ***,
respectively; the content in () is the
Variables |
|
|
LnR&D |
|
|
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
||
|
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VC*Inv_after |
0.005 |
0.030 |
0.015 |
0.015 |
0.008 |
|
|
(0.25) |
(1.06) |
(0.55) |
(0.53) |
(0.27) |
|
Lnasset |
|
0.354*** |
0.393*** |
0.391*** |
0.380*** |
|
|
|
(30.53) |
(29.51) |
(28.88) |
(26.67) |
|
ROE |
|
|
0.003*** |
0.003*** |
0.003*** |
|
|
|
|
(10.67) |
(10.46) |
(6.96) |
|
Lngov |
|
|
|
0.004 |
0.005 |
|
|
|
|
|
(0.98) |
(1.11) |
|
Lev |
|
|
|
|
0.002 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
(3.05) |
|
Constant |
15.691 |
9.261*** |
8.369*** |
8.356*** |
8.468*** |
|
|
(209.89) |
(39.36) |
(31.23) |
(31.63) |
(32.19) |
|
Year |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
|
Industry |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
Controlled |
|
Obs |
1336 |
1336 |
1336 |
1336 |
1336 |
|
R2 |
0.0649 |
0.3294 |
0.3537 |
0.3574 |
0.3303 |
11Due to length limitations, regression results of the control variables are omitted, but are available upon request.
Venture Capital and Corporate Innovation Input from the Perspective of Syndicated Investment |
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C2. Randomly Selected Experimental Group
To further test whether our results have
Figure 1. Distribution of 500 Estimated Coefficients
The
30 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
20 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
kdensity coef |
|
|
|
|
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
.02 |
.04 |
x |
.06 |
.08 |
.1 |
|
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTION
This paper examines the relationship between VC and firm innovation input. The results show that VC participation significantly promotes the R&D investment of the invested companies. This conclusion coincides with research conclusions found in the literature, such as Xu et al. (2015) and Gou and Dong (2014). While providing financial support, VC firms also guide the invested company to spend more on innovation input by participating in its business
Further distinguishing companies that have obtained syndicated investment versus sole investment, we find that the number of syndicated investment members has a significant positive correlation with innovation input, while the heterogeneity of shareholding ratio among syndicated investment members is negatively correlated with innovation input. These conclusions relating to syndicated investment characteristics provide a valuable reference for enterprises
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that attach importance to innovation activities in searching for helpful fund providers, and they also provide a theoretical basis for VC firms to select their joint partners.
This paper’s conclusions indicate that China should actively encourage and guide development of the VC industry, and constantly improve its policy, institutional, and supervision systems. The government could encourage VC firms to invest in startups through subsidies and tax incentives, among other measures, and encourage them to adopt a syndicated investment strategy, so that startups will be able to spend more on R&D, and the innovation incubation system will become more efficient. In addition, the government could guide more social funds into the VC industry and reduce investment barriers, thereby broadening the financing channels for SMEs and providing adequate financial support for their innovation activities.
Acknowledgement: This research is supported by the Humanity and Social Science Youth Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China (19C11482075)
&Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province (LY19G010005), China. This paper is a part of “Venture Capital Helps the Development of Hangzhou High- tech
Finance & Economics.
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